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POSSESSION, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, AND 
PROPORTIONALITY: CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR 
AGGREGATE HARM OFFENSES 
ANTHONY M. DILLOF* 
ABSTRACT 
 Federal prosecutions of individuals for possessing child pornography have risen steadily 
and dramatically over the last twenty years. As the number of prosecutions have increased, so 
have the penalties. Today a typical defendant charged with possessing child pornography can 
expect a seven-year prison sentence. This Article considers the question of whether such sen-
tences are just, fair, and proportionate. To answer this question, this Article adopts a retribu-
tivist perspective on punishment. Retributivism, in turn, requires evaluating the wrongfulness 
of the conduct to be punished. This Article argues that while the possession of child pornogra-
phy by a large group of persons in aggregate creates significant social harm—for example, a 
robust market for the production of child pornography—individual acts of possession, consid-
ered at the margin, have only a trivial impact. This raises a serious problem of disproportional-
ity in punishment for retributivists. This Article attempts to solve this problem by developing a 
theory of aggregate harm offenses. According to this theory, even acts that have little marginal 
impact may constitute serious moral wrongs insofar as they violate the principle of rule conse-
quentialism. Rule consequentialism requires acting pursuant to a rule with desirable social 
consequences. This Article develops a rationale for rule consequentialism and explores how 
rule consequentialist norms may be used to justify and explain not only child pornography 
possession laws but also a group of superficially unrelated offenses found in diverse areas of 
the criminal law. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 A young man, sitting at his computer, bored with his work as-
signment and looking for distraction, idly types “teen sex” into his 
Internet browser’s search engine and, as expected, is rewarded by the 
appearance of a dozen images of naked under-aged women in a varie-
ty of explicit poses. In so doing, he has committed a form of posses-
sion of child pornography that the law decrees may be punished by 
up to twenty years’ imprisonment.1 How can such substantial crimi-
nal penalties be justified for such seemingly innocuous, likely com-
monplace, and easily accomplished conduct? What has the young 
man done that is so wrong? 
 The question above is a question about child pornography posses-
sion. Child pornography possession is a type of possessory offense. Pos-
sessory offenses are a highly significant part of the criminal law.2 Yet 
they are a generally undertheorized part.3 Most criminal offenses—
rape, robbery, theft, and murder—involve harmful conduct. The mere 
possession of an item, however, is rarely a harmful state of affairs.4 
Because possession itself is rarely harmful, possessory offenses are 
sometimes grouped with other criminal offenses that do not entail 
harm to others, such as solicitation, conspiracy, and attempt.5 Solicita-
                                                                                                                  
 1. Child pornography includes images of a minor engaged in “simulated lascivious 
exhibition of the . . . pubic area . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(B)(iii) (2012). Under  
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2), (b)(1) (2012), a person who views child pornography on the Inter-
net may be liable for receiving child pornography and subject to twenty years’ imprison-
ment. See United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 998 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding capacity to 
control images stored in computer cache supports conviction for receiving child pornogra-
phy). At the very least, he would be liable under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(A) for “knowingly 
access[ing] with intent to view” child pornography, which carries a sentence of up to ten 
years. Id. § 2252A(b)(2). The penalties can be twice as high for persons who have been con-
victed of a prior child pornography or sexual offense. Id. § 2252A(b)(1)-(2). 
 2. New York State, for example, has enacted over 150 possessory offenses. See 
Markus Dirk Dubber, The Possession Paradigm: The Special Part and the Police Power 
Model of the Criminal Process, in DEFINING CRIMES: ESSAYS ON THE SPECIAL PART OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 91, 96 (R A Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2005). In state prisons alone, as of 
2011, there were approximately 49,000 persons serving sentences for drug possession. See 
E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2012: TRENDS IN ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES, 1991-2012 (2013), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p12tar9112.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DDR-XFPF]. 
 3. Some important work has been done. See, e.g., Dubber, supra note 2. See general-
ly Gideon Yaffe, In Defense of Possession, 10 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 441 (2016). 
 4. The most obvious exception is the possessing of another’s property without their 
consent; that is theft. Ironically, theft is not regarded as a possessory offense. 
 5. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 9.03[C], at 97 (7th ed. 
2015) (“Crimes of possession are ‘inchoate,’ or incomplete, offenses.”); GEORGE FLETCHER, 
RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 3.4, at 198 (1978) (describing possessory offenses as legisla-
tive responses to the vagueness of the actus reus requirement for attempts). The Model 
Penal Code includes the offense of possessing instruments of crime and weapons in its 
article on inchoate offenses. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.06 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
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tion, conspiracy, and attempt are frequently described as inchoate of-
fenses.6 Even if not themselves harmful, they are the beginning of a 
harmful course of conduct. Solicitations lead to conspiracies; conspira-
cies lead to attempts; attempts lead to offense conduct, which usually 
results in actual harm. The offense of possession of burglary tools is a 
good example of a possessory offense that conforms to the inchoate 
model of criminal offenses. The possession of unlawful burglary tools 
by an actor all too often leads to that actor’s committing a burglary.  
 This Article, however, argues that not all possessory offenses con-
form to the inchoate offense model. In particular, possession of child 
pornography should not be understood along these lines. Indeed, this 
Article contends that the criminalization of possession of child por-
nography should not be understood based on analogy to the posses-
sion of burglary tools, illegal narcotics, firearms, or stolen property—
the major categories of possessory offenses. 
 If distinct from other possessory offenses, how then should the of-
fense of possession of child pornography be understood? To what ex-
tent are the substantial criminal penalties associated with it fair and 
just? To return to the question opening this Article, what is so wrong 
about possessing child pornography? To answer these questions, this 
Article develops a theory of “aggregate harm offenses” and argues 
that the offense of possession of child pornography—and the substan-
tial penalties associated with it—are best understood in light of this 
theory. In brief, the theory of aggregate harm offenses proposes that 
there is a range of offenses—including the possession of child pornog-
raphy—where wide-spread commission of the offense actually or po-
tentially causes, in aggregate, great individual or social harm, even 
though individual instances of the offense, considered at the margin, 
have no or trivial adverse effects on anyone. Actors who commit such 
offenses violate the principle of rule consequentialism and thus are 
deserving, or at least amenable to, punishment proportionate with 
the aggregate harms associated with the offense. 
 This Article proceeds as follows: In Part II, an introduction and 
overview of federal child pornography statutes is offered. In Part III, 
an effort is made to distill the sort of sentences that are imposed up-
on typical violators of such laws, and the norm of proportionality is 
introduced and argued to be prima facie inconsistent with the penal-
ties for child pornography possession. In Part IV, a range of harms 
associated with possession are considered as potential grounds for 
child pornography possession penalties and are found wanting. In 
Part V, a variety of forms of harmless wrongdoing are examined as 
potential grounds for child pornography possession penalties; rule 
                                                                                                                  
 6. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.01-03 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 




consequentialism is introduced and argued to supply a cogent expla-
nation of the wrongfulness of child pornography possession; and the 
general relevance of rule consequentialism to the criminal law is 
shown through examining a range of disparate offenses, all of which 
involve a violation of the principle of rule consequentialism. Part VI 
briefly summarizes the Article and concludes. 
II.   A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CRIMINALIZATION OF  
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
 The sexual abuse of children has long been a crime.7 Hence, the 
production of child pornography involving the sexual abuse of children 
has, as a derivative matter, also been criminal. In contrast, the mere 
possession of child pornography has not always been a crime.8 Indeed, 
the sexualized depiction of children was tolerated well into the nine-
teenth century.9 The law has journeyed far from the nineteenth to the 
twenty-first century. This Part recounts that journey. In a nutshell, 
the history of the criminalization of the possession of child pornogra-
phy is one of increasing scope of criminalized conduct, increasing 
number of prosecutions, and increasing severity of penalties. 
 The possession and distribution of child pornography was first crim-
inalized through the general common law prohibition of obscene mate-
rials.10 Although early prosecutions were primarily focused on porno-
graphic literature, images considered obscene and corrupting of morals 
could also trigger criminal sanctions.11 Constitutional concerns, how-
ever, inhibited prosecutions. Due to a slew of First Amendment deci-
sions by the Supreme Court in the 1950s,12 the constitutional standard 
of obscenity was difficult to meet. Many images, even hard-core depic-
                                                                                                                  
 7. See generally Barry M. Coldrey, The Sexual Abuse of Children: The Historical 
Perspective, 85 STUDIES 370, 370 (1996) (noting that “sexual abuse of young people by per-
sons in positions of trust and responsibility has existed for a long time; and . . . that sexual 
abuse has been considered a serious fault or crime for centuries”); John E. B. Myers, A 
Short History of Child Protection in America, 42 FAM. L. Q. 449, 450 n.7 (2008) (noting that 
child protective cases for sexual abuse have been documented in the United States as early 
as 1735 and that the criminal prosecution for sexual assault of a minor in the nineteenth  
and early twentieth century commonly proceeded under rape statutes). 
 8. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.15 (McKinney 1977) (illustrating a common formulation of 
sexual abuse laws prior to the push to criminalize child pornography). 
 9. See PHILIP JENKINS, BEYOND TOLERANCE: CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET 
26 (2001). 
 10. See generally, Donna I. Dennis, Obscenity Law and Its Consequences in Mid-
Nineteenth-Century America, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 43 (2007) (describing early prohi-
bitions of obscene material). 
 11. Id. at 50-52. 
 12. See, e.g., Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 381-82 (1957); People v. Wepplo, 178 
P.2d 853, 855 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1947). 
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tions, were defined as merely indecent in the 1960s.13 Due to the heavy 
burden of proof that prosecutors were required to carry, child pornog-
raphy and other cases involving pornography were rarely pursued.14 
 In 1973, the Supreme Court in Miller v. California,15 established 
the modern definition of obscenity. According to the Court, material 
is “obscene” if, “taken as a whole” and “applying contemporary com-
munity standards,” it “lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or sci-
entific value,” is “patently offensive,” and is aimed at “prurient inter-
est[s].”16 Miller, combined with the prevailing relatively relaxed atti-
tudes toward child pornography in the United States, further limited 
enforcement of child pornography laws.17 
 Starting in 1976, feminist groups and decency campaigners led the 
charge to combat these relaxed attitudes.18 Attracting the attention of 
the national media, the movement against child pornography stepped 
into the limelight.19 As a result of a media blitz in 1976 and 1977, 
Congress passed the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploita-
tion Act of 1977.20 This Act targeted the commercial production of ob-
scene materials that involved children under the age of sixteen.21 
Congress drafted the Act with the intention of outlawing only such 
obscene material as outlined by the Miller test.22 Penalties for posses-
sion ranged between a ten-year statutory maximum for first-time of-
fenders with a two-year mandatory minimum, and a fifteen-year stat-
utory maximum for subsequent offenders. This Act was not replicated 
on the state level and only one person was convicted under the act.23 
 The barrier of obscenity was partly lifted in 1982 by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in New York v. Ferber.24 In Ferber, the Supreme 
Court determined the constitutionality of a New York law that pro-
                                                                                                                  
 13. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 455 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Jac-
obellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 14. JENKINS, supra note 9, at 36. 
 15. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 16. Id. at 23-24. 
 17. See Michael J. Henzey, Going on the Offensive: A Comprehensive Overview of 
Internet Child Pornography Distribution and Aggressive Legal Action, 11 APPALACHIAN 
J.L. 1, 4-5 (2011). 
 18. Id. at 5.  
 19. Id. at 11-12. 
 20. Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978). 
 21. Henzey, supra note 17, at 12. 
 22. Rosalind E. Bell, Note, Reconciling the Protect Act with the First Amendment, 87 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1878, 1886 (2012). 
 23. See Sarah Sternberg, The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 and the First 
Amendment: Virtual Antitheses, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2783, 2795 (2001). 
 24. 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982). 




hibited the promotion and distribution of material that depicted a 
child under the age of sixteen engaging in a sexual performance.25 
According to the Court, while some material may not be deemed “ob-
scene” under the Miller test, “the use of children as subjects of porno-
graphic materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and 
mental health of the child” and so may be banned.26 
 Following Ferber, Congress passed a series of acts increasing the 
regulations and penalties associated with the possession and distri-
bution of child pornography. The first of these statutes was the Child 
Protection Act of 1984.27 This Act broadened the definition of child 
pornography by (1) extending penalties to manufacturers and traf-
fickers of child pornography who did not receive financial compensa-
tion for the images produced and distributed and (2) increasing to 
eighteen the age of persons whose images qualify as child pornogra-
phy.28 Congress then acted in 1986 by passing the Child Sexual 
Abuse and Pornography Act and the Child Abuse Victims’ Rights 
Act.29 These acts outlawed the advertisement of child pornography 
and increased liability for pornographers if a child model was injured 
during the production.30 
 In 1988, Congress passed the Child Protection and Obscenity En-
forcement Act (CPOEA).31 In this act, Congress, realizing the poten-
tial for technology in the creation of pornography, prohibited the use 
of computers to distribute child pornography.32 The regulations pur-
suant to CPOEA also required producers of sexually explicit material 
to obtain proof of age for every actor, regardless of sexual activity, in 
their productions.33 
 Congress’s efforts to fight child pornography intensified in the 
1990s. Congress passed the Child Protection Restoration and Penal-
ties Enhancement Act in 1990.34 This Act addressed two important 
areas. First, the Act increased and strengthened penalties for the dis-
tribution of child pornography. Sentences were increased from be-
                                                                                                                  
 25. Id. at 774.  
 26. See id. at 758. 
 27. Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984). 
 28. See JENKINS, supra note 9, at 36. 
 29. Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-628, 100 Stat. 
3510 (1986). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 
Stat. 4486 (1988). 
 32. Id. 
 33. 28 C.F.R. §§ 75.2, 75.5 (2016). 
 34. Child Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-647, 104 Stat. 4816 (1990). 
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tween four months to a year, depending on the defendant’s criminal 
history. Second, this Act made simple possession of child pornogra-
phy illegal for the first time.35 The initial sentencing guidelines for 
the possession of child pornography established no minimum penalty 
and a maximum of five years’ imprisonment.36 
 That same year, the Supreme Court clarified the constitutional 
restrictions on the criminalization of child pornography possession. 
In Osborne v. Ohio, the Supreme Court upheld an Ohio law that 
banned the possession of child pornography in the interest of pre-
venting child sexual abuse.37 Following its earlier reasoning in Fer-
ber, the Court granted that people have an interest in possessing 
child pornography, but reasoned that states have the ability to enact 
legislation to further their interests in protecting the “physical and 
psychological well-being of . . . minor[s].”38 
 In 1996, Congress passed the Child Pornography Prevention Act 
(CPPA).39 The CPPA expanded the definition of child pornography to 
include pornographic images that did not utilize actual children in 
their production. “Virtual” pornography, as defined in the CPPA, in-
cluded scanned pictures of a real child manipulated by a computer to 
create a sexually explicit photograph.40 The CPPA also increased the 
minimum sentence for trafficking and possessing child pornography 
by eight to twelve months, with another increase in sentencing if the 
defendant used a computer to produce, transfer, or obtain child por-
nography.41 In 2002, however, the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Free 
Speech Coalition held that certain provisions of the CPPA were over-
ly broad and were not related to the prevention of sexual abuse asso-
ciated with real child pornography.42 The Court explained that virtu-
al pornography “is not ‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse of 
children,” and “the causal link” to harm is “contingent and indirect,” 
depending upon “some unquantified potential for subsequent crimi-
nal acts.”43 Accordingly, it held the CPPA partly unconstitutional.44  
                                                                                                                  
 35. Id. § 323(a), (b), 104 Stat. 4818, 4819 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2252). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 103 (1990). 
 38. Id. at 109. 
 39. Child Pornography Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 
(1996). 
 40. Id. 
 41. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2G2.2, 2G2.4 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 1995) (amended 1996). 
 42. 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002). 
 43. Id. at 250. 
 44. Id. at 258. 




 In response to Ashcroft, Congress enacted the Prosecutorial Rem-
edies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act 
of 2003 (PROTECT Act).45 This Act narrowed the criminalization of 
virtual child pornography to only those computer-generated images 
that an ordinary person would conclude depicted an actual minor en-
gaged in sexually explicit conduct.46 The PROTECT Act also changed 
the sentencing guidelines for the trafficking and possession of child 
pornography.47 Minimum sentences were increased depending on the 
number of computer images of children engaged in sexually explicit 
conduct that a defendant produced, sold, transferred, or possessed.48 
The maximum penalty was increased from fifteen to twenty years for 
receiving child pornography, and the maximum penalty for posses-
sion was increased from five to ten years.49 Moreover a minimum 
penalty of five years’ imprisonment was introduced for receipt.50 
 The most recent change to child pornography law occurred in 
2008. That year, Congress passed the PROTECT Our Children Act,51 
which created a new offense, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(7). This new of-
fense made it unlawful to knowingly produce with intent to distrib-
ute, or to knowingly distribute, “child pornography that is an adapted 
or modified depiction of an identifiable minor.”52 This new offense 
also carried with it a statutory maximum of fifteen years.53 
 Currently, federal criminal prohibitions of child pornography are 
contained in chapters 71 and 110 of title 18 of the United States 
Code. Section 2256A prohibits and penalizes the production of child 
pornography.54 Section 2252A concerns nonproduction offenses.55 A 
                                                                                                                  
 45. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003). 
 46. The Act provided that child pornography includes any “digital image, computer 
image, or computer-generated image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” Id. § 502(a)(1) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B)). 
“‘Indistinguishable’ ” in turn was defined as “virtually indistinguishable, in that the depic-
tion is such that an ordinary person viewing the depiction would conclude that the depic-
tion is of an actual minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.” Id. § 502(c) (amending 18 
U.S.C. § 2256). An interesting question is what grounds an ordinary person would have for 
concluding that a depiction was of an actual minor, rather than a computer-generated im-
age of an actual minor, in cases where it was possible to produce, by computer, images that 
were indistinguishable from depictions of actual minors. 
 47. See id. § 504(a) (adding 18 U.S.C. § 1466A). 
 48. See id. § 504(c) (directing that violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1466A be sentenced pursu-
ant to U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015)). 
 49. Id. § 103(a)(1)(B)(i), (C)(ii). 
 50. Id. § 103(b)(1)(C)(i). 
 51. PROTECT Our Children Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-401, 122 Stat. 4229 (2008). 
 52. Id. § 304(a)(3) (adding 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(7)). 
 53. Id. § 304(b) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)). 
 54. 18 U.S.C. § 2256A (2012). 
 55. Id. § 2252A. 
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person who, under section (a)(2), “knowingly receives or distributes” 
any child pornography faces a minimum penalty of five years and a 
maximum penalty of twenty years.56 If that violator has a prior con-
viction for a sex offense involving a minor, the penalty range increas-
es to a fifteen-year minimum and a forty-year maximum.57 Further-
more, any person who, under subsection (a)(5), “knowingly possesses, 
or knowingly accesses with intent to view” child pornography may be 
imprisoned for up to ten years with the maximum raised to twenty 
years in cases involving the depiction of a child under twelve.58 If the 
person has a prior sex-abuse-related conviction, he faces a minimum 
term of ten years’ imprisonment and maximum of twenty years.59 For 
purposes of this Article, I shall refer to both forms of nonproduction 
offenses under subsections (a)(2) and (a)(5) as child pornography  
possessory offenses.60 
 All told, these statutory changes have led to substantial increases 
in incarceration for child pornography offenders. In 1996, 77% of 
child pornography offenders received a prison sentence; in 2006, 97% 
did.61 The mean sentence for production offenders has risen from 63.5 
months in 1992 to 269.1 months in 2010.62 In addition, paralleling 
this rise in severity of punishment, the number of offenders sen-
                                                                                                                  
 56. Id. § 2252A(a)(2), (b)(1). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. § 225A(a)(5)(A), (b)(2). 
 59. Id. 
 60. In addition to increasing the statutory penalty ranges for child pornography 
offenses, Congress has directed the U.S. Sentencing Commission on numerous occasions 
to increase the penalties for pornography offenders under the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines. See Melissa Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child Pornography Sentencing: Em-
pirical Validity or Political Rhetoric?, 22 STAN L. & POL’Y REV. 545, 545 (2011) (“Con-
gress has repeatedly forced increases in the federal sentencing guidelines using uncon-
ventional means for child pornography offenses, notwithstanding opposition from the 
United States Sentencing Commission.”); Troy Stabenow, Deconstructing the Myth of 
Careful Study: A Primer on the Flawed Progression of the Child Pornography Guide-
lines, LIBRARY OF THE U.S. COURTS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT (2009), 
http://www.lb7.uscourts.gov/documents/INND/110CR40.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MKJ-AJNT] 
(detailing changes in the Guidelines and their effect). See generally U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, THE HISTORY OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES (2009) [hereinafter THE 
HISTORY OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES]. Indeed, the only time in the history of 
the Guidelines that Congress itself has directly modified the Guidelines, rather than leav-
ing the ultimate decision to the Commission, was when it increased child pornography 
sentencing levels in the PROTECT Act. Id. at 38.  
 61. MARK MOTIVANS & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEX EXPLOITATION OFFENDERS, 2006, at 5 (2007), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fpcseo06.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NEM-CF35]. 








tenced has increased steadily on the federal level. In 1991, there were 
fewer than 100 prosecutions for all forms of child pornography of-
fenses.63 In 2010, there were approximately 1700.64 
III.   PENALTIES AND PROPORTIONALITY 
 In assessing whether the penalties associated with child pornog-
raphy possession laws are just, it is important to have a sense of 
how and to whom they are applied. It is unclear how many persons 
have violated federal laws on child pornography possession. Given 
that the crime is just a few clicks away on any Internet-connected 
device, and that, at least in young men, interest in sexual images of 
minors is common,65 undoubtedly only a small portion of offenders 
are actually apprehended and prosecuted. Due to detection limits 
and prosecutorial priorities, persons such as the hypothetical child 
pornography Internet viewer described at the very beginning of this 
Article are rarely, if ever, prosecuted. Based on overbreadth, a seri-
ous attack on child pornography possession laws might be mount-
ed.66 But that is not what this Article explores. This Article is inter-
ested in examining actual practice under the law rather than the 
theoretical overbreadth of it. 
 In studying actual practice, some degree of idealization and gen-
eralization is unavoidable. For the sake of concreteness, this Article 
focuses on defendants, statutes, and penalties within the federal 
criminal justice system.67 Section A of this Part examines what sort 
of penalties are typically meted out for child pornography possession 
and related offenses. Section B compares these penalties to those of 
other federal offenses. 
                                                                                                                  
 63. Id. at 248 fig.9-1. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See JENKINS, supra note 9, at 28-30 (discussing social and psychological theories 
that those interested in child pornography might not be far from the “normal” population). 
 66. Under federal law, for example, an eighteen-year-old, with no criminal history, 
who sends to his seventeen-year-old girlfriend a photo of the two of them engaged in sex 
would be subject to a mandatory sentence of five years’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 
2252A(b)(1). Accordingly, some commentators have argued for “Romeo and Juliet”-type 
limits for child pornography laws. See, e.g., JoAnne Sweeny, Do Sexting Prosecutions Vio-
late Teenagers’ Constitutional Rights?, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 951 (2011). 
 67. While not the focus of this Article, states have also significantly increased the 
penalties for possession of child pornography since 2000. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Dis-
entangling Child Pornography from Child Sex Abuse, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 853, 857-60 
(2011). For example, in 2003, Georgia increased the penalty for child pornography posses-
sion from a one-year maximum to a twenty-year maximum with a five-year minimum. 
2003 Ga. Laws 573 (codified at GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-12-100 (2003)). In Nevada, repeated 
convictions of child pornography possession can result in life imprisonment. NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 200.730(2) (2005). 
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A.   Typical Defendants and Penalties 
 As noted, the number of prosecutions for possession of child por-
nography at the federal level has increased dramatically over the last 
twenty years. In 1991, there were a de minimis number of prosecu-
tions for child pornography possessory offenses.68 In 2010, there were 
approximately 900.69 Undoubtedly, there is wide variation among 
these 900 cases. As a result of a recent report by the Unites States 
Sentencing Commission,70 valuable information has been gained 
about prosecution practice. 
 In the United States, the typical child pornography possessor de-
fendant is white, male, in his early forties, employed, and a United 
States citizen.71 It is unclear whether he is a pedophile.72 He has a 
very limited criminal history.73 Formerly, law enforcement made sub-
stantial arrests of those who purchased child pornography from 
commercial Internet sites. Sting operations against sellers produced 
credit card transaction information that, in turn, allowed the identi-
fication of buyers. With the proliferation of peer-to-peer (P2P) file-
sharing sites, however, the commercial market for child pornography 
dramatically contracted.74 As a result, the typical defendant today 
has probably been apprehended because of his involvement in a P2P 
file sharing network or an Internet forum, such as a bulletin board, 
newsgroup, or chat room.75 Federal investigators troll such networks 
using specialized software to determine IP addresses of those sharing 
child pornographic images. With an IP address, investigators can ob-
tain a search warrant for the individual’s computer, leading to an 
arrest for receiving child pornography.76 The evidence obtained will 
                                                                                                                  
 68. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 62, at 248 fig. 9-1. 
 69. Id. 
 70. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 62. 
 71. Id. at 141-43, 162. 
 72. See id. at 75 (some social research finds 61% of possessors of child pornography 
are pedophiles; some finds such possessors typically are not pedophiles). 
 73. See id. at 143. 
 74. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CHILD EXPLOITATION 
PREVENTION AND INTERDICTION: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 11-16 (2010) (noting that “it is 
evident that technological advances have contributed significantly to the overall increase in 
the child pornography threat”); accord United States v. C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 343, 367 
(E.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting the view of law enforcement and prosecutors that “child pornogra-
phy was a dying industry until the Internet and peer-to-peer networks developed.” (quoting 
Neil MacBride, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia)). See generally 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 912, 920 (2005) (describing 
mechanics of peer-to-peer programs). 
 75. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 62, at 149 tbl.6-9. In 2010, 56.1% of defend-
ants received child pornography through noncommercial P2P file sharing or internet fo-
rums; 22.9% received it through email, instant messaging, texting or other means. Id.  
 76. Id. at 145. 




likely support a conviction for both possession and receipt of child 
pornography.77 The typical federal defendant will thus be exposed to 
a potential sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment if he does not 
have any prior sex convictions and forty years’ imprisonment if  
he does.78 
 Of course, the maximum available statutory penalty is not always 
imposed. Judges have the power to impose a lower sentence within a 
statutorily prescribed sentencing range. In the federal criminal jus-
tice system, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) play a 
significant role in guiding the exercise of a judge’s discretion. The 
Guidelines establish a relatively complicated, multi-step process for 
determining an offender’s recommended sentence.79  
 The Guidelines might apply to the typical possessor of child pornog-
raphy defendant in the following way: An actor’s downloading images 
on his computer would support a charge of either receiving child por-
nography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2), or possessing it under § 
2252A(a)(5), resulting in a base offense level under the Guidelines of 
eighteen or twenty-two, respectively.80 In fact, it is about twice as likely 
the offender will be convicted for possessing as for receiving.81 Whether 
a defendant is sentenced for receipt or possession is determined by the 
prosecutor’s charging decision. This decision correlates strongly with 
the United States Attorney’s office that happens to handle the case.82 
 Sentencing enhancements are added to the base sentencing level. 
Because our typical defendant is using a computer, his offense level 
is increased by two.83 Because his P2P software is probably making 
images available to others, his level is increased by another two.84 
Because he probably has an image of a minor under twelve, his level 
is increased by another two.85 Because he probably has an image that 
involves penetration or bondage, his offense level is increased by 
four.86 Assuming he has at least two images—a fairly safe assump-
                                                                                                                  
 77. Except for a relatively small percentage of offenders who fabricate their own child 
pornography or accidentally come into possession of it, all those who knowingly possess 
child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5) also knowingly receive child pornography 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2). Id. at 147. 
 78. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1) (2012).  
 79. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2G2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2015). 
 80. Id. § 2G2.2(a). 
 81. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 62, at 146 fig.6-14. 
 82. Id. at 237. 
 83. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(6) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).  
 84. Id. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F).  
 85. Id. § 2G2.2(b)(2). 
 86. Id. § 2G2.2(b)(4). 
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tion—his offense level is increased by another two.87 In sum, the typi-
cal offender probably qualifies for an offense level of thirty. Assum-
ing, as is very likely the case, he has no criminal history,88 he is look-
ing at a penalty under the Guidelines of approximately nine years.89  
 Of course, the Guidelines are not always followed. In about 17% of 
the cases, prosecutors enter into plea stipulations that do not support 
potential sentencing enhancements.90 Additionally, in about 10% of 
the cases, the government seeks a downward variance or departure.91 
And beyond this, in almost half of the cases, judges sua sponte im-
pose sentences below that recommended by the Guidelines, with an 
average downward departure of about four years.92 
 So where does that leave our typical child porn possessor defend-
ant? The greatest difficulty in predicting a sentence of a given offender 
is accounting for variation in charging practices in different areas of 
the country.93 While there is significant room for variation depending 
on geography, based on 2010 data, the bottom-line average sentence of 
a person engaged in possession of child porn, typically through P2P file 
sharing, was approximately seven years—the median sentence being 
approximately 6.5 years.94 Less than 2% of defendants receive a proba-
tionary sentence.95 Seven years’ imprisonment is clearly a whole lot 
better than twenty years. Yet there remain significant questions about 
whether such penalties for child pornography possession are consistent 
with the principle of proportional punishment.  
                                                                                                                  
 87. Id. § 2G2.2(b)(7)(A). 
 88. In 2010, “81.1 percent of R/T/D offenders and 82.2 percent of possession offenders 
were in Criminal History Category I.” U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N supra note 62, at 143. 
 89. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).  
 90. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N supra note 62, at 223. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 224, 224 n.53.  
 93. See id. at 245. Offenders involved in P2P file sharing are likely to receive a 4.5 
year greater sentence if they were charged and convicted of receipt rather than possession. 
Id. at 215. Because facts supporting a conviction of possession will virtually always support 
a conviction of receipt, prosecutorial discretion significantly affects sentencing outcome.  
 94. Id. at 226 fig.8-13. Among those whose sentences were limited by undercharging, 
plea agreements, and downward departures, the median sentence was 63 months, or 5.25 
years. Among those whose sentences were not so limited, the median sentence was 135 
months, or 11.25 years. The former category was 3.7 times as large as the latter. Id. 
 95. See id. at 130. 




B.   Proportionality 
 Proportionality of punishments is commonly accepted as a desir-
able feature of criminal justice systems.96 The popularity of propor-
tionality can be explained by its appeal to punishment theorists of 
many stripes. Those advocating deterrence-based and incapacita-
tion-based theories of punishment have favored proportionality in 
punishment.97 Likewise, the idea that wrongdoers morally deserve 
to suffer a proportionate punishment is one of the key elements of 
retributive justice.98 
 Retributive justice is a moral principle with two components: one 
negative, one positive. According to the negative component, it would 
be unjust to subject a person to punishment greater than deserved, 
where desert is a function of the person’s wrongdoing and culpability 
for that wrongdoing.99 Desert supplies a presumptive ceiling for pun-
ishment. According to the positive component, the facts underlying 
desert supply an affirmative noninstrumental reason to punish the 
person as much as the person deserves.100 Desert supplies a presump-
tive floor for punishment. In combination, negative and positive re-
tributivism determine an amount, or at least a range, of punishment 
that is deserved. The negative component most likely has greater and 
broader intuitive appeal, and frequently finds its way into mixed or 
pluralistic theories of punishment. This Article will be examining 
whether the penalties for child pornography possession are dispro-
portionate from the perspective of negative retributivism, i.e., wheth-
er they are greater than deserved. 
 Proportionality itself is an ambiguous term. It can refer to either 
cardinal or ordinal proportionality.101 Cardinal proportionality is a 
principle of punishment that sets absolute values of punishment, 
with greater punishments being assigned to offenses of greater gravi-
ty (however gravity might be defined). For example, lex talionis, as-
                                                                                                                  
 96. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (including among 
the general goals of sentencing “to safeguard offenders against excessive, disproportionate 
or arbitrary punishment”). 
 97. See generally Stephen T. Parr, Symmetric Proportionality: A New Perspective on 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 68 TENN. L. REV. 41 (2000) (arguing that sym-
metric proportionality is a valid and superior incarnation of the proportionality principle). 
 98. See Alec Walen, Retributive Justice, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (2015). 
 99. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, 
MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS 270 (2009); Anthony M. Dillof, Punishing Bias: An Examina-
tion of the Theoretical Foundations of Bias Crime Laws, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1015, 1027-29 
(1997). 
 100. MOORE, supra note 99, at 270; Walen, supra note 98.  
 101. ALEC, WALEN, Retributive Justice, STAN. ENCYC. OF PHIL. (2014), https://plato. 
stanford.edu/entries/justice-retributive/ [https://perma.cc/FSQ6-8S32]. 
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serts a form of cardinal proportionality. According to lex talionis, the 
severity of punishment a person should receive is equal to the gravity 
of wrongdoing for which he is culpable.102 If a criminal code only con-
tained one offense, it would still make sense to ask whether the pun-
ishment for that offense was proportional given the gravity of the 
wrongdoing and the sanction. In contrast, ordinal proportionality 
merely requires that greater punishments be assigned to offenses of 
greater gravity, leaving open what the absolute values of any pun-
ishment may be.103 As a conceptual matter, ordinal proportionality 
can be assessed only within a punishment regime having multiple 
offenses and associated sanctions because order is relative. The of-
fense comprising a single offense regime cannot be either in or out of 
order. Inconsistency with ordinal proportionality logically implies in-
consistency with cardinal proportionality for at least one wrongdoing-
punishment assignment within the punishment regime because at 
least one offense must have a sanction that, in absolute terms, is too 
high or low. Finally, ordinal proportionality underdetermines pun-
ishment levels compared to cardinal proportionality. For example, if 
there are two offenses, A and B, A being the offense of greater gravity 
and B the offense with a harsher sanction, there is ordinal dispropor-
tionality. Whether the disproportionality should be cured by raising 
the punishment for A or lowering the punishment for B (or both), 
however, depends on considerations of cardinal proportionality. 
 Prima facie, the penalties for possessing child pornography appear 
ordinally disproportionate. The average federal sentence for a person 
convicted of abusive sexual contact with a minor (e.g., fondling), is 
about four years.104 The average sentence for nonforcible sexual in-
tercourse with a minor—commonly referred to as “statutory rape”—is 
about three years.105 That is less than half of the average penalty for 
possession of child pornography.106 A more detailed analysis is pro-
vided by Troy Stabenow.107 Stabenow considers one defendant con-
victed of distributing child pornography who possesses an image of a 
child under twelve, possesses a picture involving bondage, used a 
computer, emailed five photos to another, and possessed four short 
movie clips. If he had pleaded guilty in 1987, Stabenow calculates, 
                                                                                                                  
 102. See Jeremy Waldron, Lex Talionis, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 25, 26 (1992) (arguing for a 
more abstract interpretation of the basic lex talionis rule that punishment “should be the 
same as the act which constituted the offense”). 
 103. See id. at 43-44. 
 104. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N supra note 62, at 137 (averaging the sentence lengths 
for possession-only offenders and other classes of sexual offenders).  
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Stabenow, supra note 60. 




the Guidelines would have recommended a sentence of twelve to 
eighteen months. In 2004, they would have recommended a sentence 
of 188-235 months. Stabenow considers another defendant who is 
convicted of possessing child pornography and who has a picture of a 
child under twelve, used a computer to obtain the image, had two 
movies and ten pictures. In 1991, the Guidelines would recommend a 
sentence of six to twelve months; in 2004, they would recommend a 
sentence of forty-one to fifty-one months. In contrast, a man who con-
tacted a twelve-year-old girl over the Internet and had repeated sex 
with her, under the 2006 Guidelines, would face only seventy to 
eighty-seven months in prison—a length of time comparable to that 
recommended for the possession defendant and approximately one-
third of the time recommended for the distribution defendant.108 In-
deed, the penalty recommended for the distribution defendant is sig-
nificantly greater than received by an actual defendant found guilty 
of forcibly raping a nine-year-old girl twice a week for two years, 
sometimes causing so much trauma she passed out.109 It is therefore 
hardly an exaggeration to say that under federal law, greater pun-
ishments are meted out for possessing images of wrongful acts with 
children than actually engaging in the acts themselves.110 Likewise, if 
violent crimes are used as a benchmark, the penalties for child por-
nography possession may also appear disproportionate. As one court 
has observed, under the Guidelines, a defendant convicted of pos-
sessing on his computer two nonviolent videos of seventeen-year-olds 
engaging in consensual sex and a person with some criminal history 
who was convicted of aggravated assault with a firearm that resulted 
in bodily injury would receive the same sentence.111 
 Furthermore, the penalties for possessing child pornography may 
appear cardinally disproportionate. Whether they are so, however, 
requires assessing the degree of wrongfulness of the offense. Wrong-
fulness is generally understood to be a matter of the harm inflicted or 
risked and the culpability of the wrongdoer for the harm inflicted or 
risked.112 An inquiry thus must be made regarding the harms inflict-
                                                                                                                  
 108. See id. at 27-29. 
 109. Compare id. at 26 with United States v. Kane, 470 F.3d 1277 (8th Cir. 2006) (re-
sulting in a sentence of 210 months which was ultimately reduced to 120 months).  
 110. Disparities on the state level can be even greater. In Arizona, a defendant was 
sentenced to 200 years for possessing twenty child pornography images while a defendant 
who kidnaped and sexually assaulted a fourteen-year-old girl selling candy door-to-door 
received a one-year sentence. See Hessick, supra note 67, at 862 (discussing State v. Ber-
ger, 134 P.3d 378 (Ariz. 2006)). Six states punish the possession of child pornography as 
severely as its production or distribution. Id. at 863. 
 111. United States v. Dorvee, 604 F.3d 84, 97 (2d Cir. 2010) (calculating a range of 
forty-six to fifty-seven months for both). 
 112. See MOORE, supra note 99, at 81. 
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ed or risked by a possessor of child pornography. The harms associat-
ed with acts of sexual abuse of minors are well known. What are the 
harms associated with child pornography possession? 
IV.   THE HARMS OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSION 
 There is a range of harms associated with possessing child pornogra-
phy. These harms are, to varying degrees, analogous to harms associat-
ed with other possessory offenses. This Part surveys the harms associat-
ed with possession of child pornography in an effort to systematically 
compare them with the harms associated with other possessory offenses. 
A.   Enabling Harms 
 The primary harms associated with some types of possessory of-
fenses may be called “enabling harms.” Firearms may be employed by 
ex-felons to commit crimes of violence. Burglary tools may facilitate 
the commission of property crimes. Counterfeiting equipment may be 
used to produce false currency. The possession of certain contraband 
items enables the possessor to engage in nonpossession crimes of var-
ious sorts. Likewise, possession of child pornography, it may be ar-
gued, facilitates instances of child sexual abuse. There is anecdotal 
evidence of images of children engaging in sexual acts being shown to 
would-be victims to “groom” them to engage in sex acts.113 
 The difficulties with justifying the punishments associated with 
child pornography possession along these lines are theoretical and 
empirical. On the theoretical side, scholars have expressed discom-
fort at the practice of criminalizing conduct that enables further 
harm in the absence of proof that the further harm was intended. An-
tony Duff, for example, has argued that:  
[T]he law should not prohibit intrinsically harmless conduct on the 
mere grounds that the agent might go on to create a risk of harm, 
since this fails to treat citizens as responsible agents who can be 
expected to recogni[z]e and respond to the good reasons that the 
law anyway offers for not going on to create such risk.114  
                                                                                                                  
 113. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 62, at 110 (“Some perpetrators use 
such images that depict victims enjoying themselves to groom other child victims.”); Id. 
at n.26 (citing Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 
121(1)(3), 110 Stat. 3009); see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990) (identify-
ing possibility of child seduction as a ground for upholding constitutionality of child 
pornography possession criminalization). 
 114. R.A. Duff, Criminalizing Endangerment, in DEFINING CRIMES: ESSAYS ON THE 
SPECIAL PART OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 43, 63 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2005); see 
also R.A. DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 391 (1996) (arguing if the law is to treat citizens as 
responsible agents, criminalizing possession of firearms and drugs is unjustified). 




Duff allows an exception in cases of persons who cannot be respon-
sive to reason. Thus, he does not object to criminal liability for in-
toxicated persons in charge of a motor vehicle who have not yet 
chosen or attempted to drive.115 Persons in possession of child por-
nography, however, retain their full autonomy regarding whether 
they will utilize the images now at their disposal to entice children 
into unlawful sexual conduct. 
 On the empirical side, the connection between possessing child 
pornography and its use in child sexual abuse is speculative. There is 
no data on how frequently child pornography is used in the commis-
sion of child sexual abuse or how frequently it is a critical element to 
the commission of the offense. For example, there is anecdotal evi-
dence of grooming children through the use of adult pornography.116 
Other means, such as enticements,117 are of course available to influ-
ence children. In contrast, absent counterfeiting equipment, many 
would-be counterfeiters would be thwarted, and without firearms, 
many felons would be appreciably hamstrung when it came to com-
mitting robberies and other offenses. Furthermore, there is a rela-
tively weak correlation between the possession of child pornography 
and the use of it to commit child sexual abuse. This is because many 
who possess child pornography do not use it to commit child sexual 
abuse but simply possess for interest, pleasure, or curiosity.118 In con-
trast, there is likely a limited number of persons who would possess 
categorically prohibited weapons, such as rocket launchers119 or 
molds for United States coins120 for benign reasons. Finally, many 
possession offenses ensure that there is a strong correlation between 
the possession of contraband and the commission of a further crime 
by requiring, as an element of the offense, that the possessor intend 
to use the contraband item for a wrongful purposes.121 Possession of 
child pornography lacks any such element. It is hard to imagine that 
                                                                                                                  
 115. See R.A. Duff, Criminalizing Endangerment, supra note 114, at 63. 
 116. How Do Predators Groom Kids?, INTERNET SAFETY 101, http://www. 
internetsafety101.org/grooming.htm [https://perma.cc/PMC3-MKV2] (“Predators often use 
pornography and child pornography to lower a child’s inhibitions and use their adult status 
to influence and control a child’s behavior.”). 
 117. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 251 (2002) (noting in the context of 
pedophiles that “cartoons, video games, and candy . . . might be used for immoral purposes”). 
 118. Frequently, sentencing opinions in child pornography sentencing cases blame the 
defendant’s obsession with child pornography on depression or compulsive behavior. See 
Hamilton, supra note 60, at 563 (collecting cases). 
 119. 18 U.S.C. § 921 (1968). 
 120. 18 U.S.C. § 487 (2012) (making or possessing of counterfeit dies for coins). 
 121. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.06(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (Under the Model 
Penal Code, where implemented, it is a misdemeanor to possess tool specially made for 
criminal use if there is a “purpose to employ it criminally.”).  
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concern about the use of child pornography as an enabler for child 
sexual abuse justifies the substantial penalties described above. 
B.   Gateway Harms 
 The justification for the penalties for some possessory offenses like-
ly rests on what I shall refer to as “gateway harms.” Many justifica-
tions have been advanced for the criminalization of narcotics posses-
sion. The most common explanation likely runs along these lines: (1) 
drug use increases an individual’s predilection for more drugs and 
harder drugs, (2) the repeated use of hard drugs leads to addiction, 
and (3) addiction both harms the user and society, which bears the 
cost of the user’s trying to support his habit through crimes against 
persons and property.122 Being “most common,” however, does not 
mean universally accepted. Growing doubt as to whether such a caus-
al chain is initiated by the recreational use of marijuana may well ac-
count for the generally low penalties for marijuana possession123 and 
the recent dramatic movement toward marijuana decriminalization.124 
 In a manner analogous to the use of narcotics, child pornography, 
it has been suggested, may (1) whet the appetite of the possessor, or 
otherwise lower his inhibitions to engage in child sexual abuse, and 
(2) lead him to commit acts of child sexual abuse he otherwise would 
not have committed.125 Possession, in other words, is a gateway to 
abuse. The social science data concerning the existence of this gate-
way effect, however, is inconclusive—similar to the claim that there 
is a causal relation between the viewing of adult pornography and 
the commission of rape.126 
                                                                                                                  
 122. See Jeffrey DeSimone, Is Marijuana a Gateway Drug?, 24 EASTERN ECON. J. 149 
(1998); see also DENISE B. KANDEL, STAGES AND PATHWAYS OF DRUG INVOLVEMENT: 
EXAMINING THE GATEWAY HYPOTHESIS (2002). 
 123. See generally Fate by Weight: Examining Marijuana Felonies Across the United 
States, DRUG TREATMENT, http://www.drugtreatment.com/expose/marijuana-felony-
amounts-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/VZ88-5YYE] (documenting penalties for marijuana 
possession across the U.S.). 
 124. Brianna Gurciullo et al., Weed Rush: The Marijuana Legalization Movement 
Begins in the States, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (Aug. 16, 2015), 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/08/16/17827/marijuana-legalization-movement-begins-states 
[https://perma.cc/7CDE-ALZN]. 
 125. A prominent member of Congress, for example, has asserted a causal relation 
between child pornography and child sexual abuse. According to Senator Jesse Helms, 
“[t]here have been dozens of studies by respected experts who come to the same conclu-
sion—child pornography is indeed a cause of child molestations.” 137 CONG. REC. S10, 322 
(daily ed. July 18, 1991). Senator Helms, however, did not identify any such study. 
 126. See generally, Hamilton, supra note 60, at 577 (citing aggregate statistic studies 
finding inverse correlations between consumption of pornography and rape rates); Hessick, 
supra note 67, at 878 (reviewing literature regarding the “long . . . contested issue” and 
concluding that “adult pornography [does] not appear to cause violence against women”). 




 According to most current social science research, viewing child 
pornography does not cause persons to commit sex offenses in the 
absence of risk factors.127 While research supports the proposition 
that child molesters consume child pornography, less is known about 
whether possessors of child pornography are child molesters.128 One 
study of over 200 individuals suspected of viewing child pornography, 
however, found that only 0.8% were investigated for child molesta-
tion in a six-year follow-up period.129 Furthermore, as one commenta-
tor has noted, “[c]orrelation does not prove causation.”130 Undoubted-
ly, for some persons, child pornography exposure may strengthen “ex-
isting tendencies in ways that may create tipping-point effects on be-
haviors if other risk factors are also present.”131 The relevant—and 
unanswered—question is how large this group is compared to the 
universe of persons exposed to child pornography.132 
                                                                                                                  
 127. See Drew A. Kingston et al., Pornography Use and Sexual Aggression: The Impact 
of Frequency and Type of Pornography Use on Recidivism Among Sexual Offenders, 34 
AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 341, 347-48 (2008) (finding that child sex abusers who viewed pornog-
raphy prior to committing contact offenses viewed adult pornography rather than child 
pornography); Michael C. Seto & Angela W. Eke, The Criminal Histories and Later Offend-
ing of Child Pornography Offenders, 17 SEXUAL ABUSE 201, 201 (2005) (“[T]here are no 
published data on the future offending of child pornography offenders.”); Jesse P. Bas-
baum, Note, Inequitable Sentencing for Possession of Child Pornography: A Failure to Dis-
tinguish Voyeurs from Pederasts, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1281, 1305 (2010) (“On the critical 
question of whether possession of child pornography will lead an offender to ‘cross over’ to 
contact offenses, many studies have found no causal connection between the two.”). 
 128. See Neil Malamuth & Mark Huppin, Drawing the Line on Virtual Child Pornog-
raphy: Bringing the Law in Line with the Research Evidence, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 773, 790 (2007) (“There have been a few relevant studies with non-pedophiles or 
non-child molesters, but these have examined only a very small subset of the relevant is-
sues. More common are studies with pedophiles and child molesters that survey their us-
age of child pornography.” (footnote omitted)). 
 129. See Jérôme Endrass et al., The Consumption of Internet Child Pornography and 
Violent and Sex Offending, 9 BMC PSYCHIATRY 43, 43 (2009); see also Michael C. Seto et 
al., Contact Sexual Offending by Men with Online Sexual Offenses, 23 SEXUAL ABUSE 124, 
136 (2011) (meta analysis finding that “online offenders rarely go on to commit detected 
contact sexual offenses”). 
 130. Hessick, supra note 67, at 876. 
 131. Malamuth & Huppin, supra note 128, at 817. 
 132. Dennis Howitt, Pornography and the Pedophile: Is It Criminogenic?, 68 BRIT. J. 
MED. PSYCHOL. 15 (1995) (concluding after interviews with a small sample of contact child 
sex offenders that pornography has no simple direct causal effect on offending; some offenders 
had no contact with pornography before first offense, and were as likely, or more likely, to be 
aroused by everyday images of children); see also L. Webb, J. Craissati & S. Keen, Character-
istics of Internet Child Pornography Offenders: A Comparison with Child Molesters, 19 SEX 
ABUSE 449, 451 (2007) (reviewing research on the links between contacting offending and 
viewing child pornography and concluding that “as yet, there is no empirical support for a 
direct causal link between internet sex offending and the commission of contact offenses”). 
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C.   Correlation Harms 
 There is an additional set of harms caused by the possessor of 
child pornography that arguably grounds the penalties associated 
with child pornography possession. These are harms not causally 
connected to the possession of child pornography. If these harms in 
fact justify such penalties, then child pornography possession would 
differ significantly from other possessory offenses. 
 According to one potential justification of the penalties for child 
pornography possession, possession of child pornography, rather than 
causing child sexual abuse, is evidence that the offender previously 
engaged in undetected acts of child sexual abuse. The relatively high 
penalties for possession of child pornography would be justified on 
the grounds that they are deserved for past, unpunished wrongs. 
Thus, past instances of child sexual abuse, although they are harms 
caused by the possessor of child pornography, are not caused by the 
possession itself; they are merely correlated with it. 
 This theory, sometimes obliquely expressed,133 is an unusual one. 
The theory has not been adopted in other areas where it might work 
comfortably. Consider drug use. Most drug addicts, in the course of 
their drug history, have committed numerous violations of narcotics 
possession laws for which they have not been punished. Neverthe-
less, the Supreme Court has held that offenses that criminalize sta-
tus, such as being a drug addict, violate the due process principle 
that criminal sanctions may only be imposed for voluntary acts.134 
The Court thus implicitly rejected the idea that past unpunished 
voluntary acts could constitutionally be the basis for punishment. 
Such a theory, if accepted, would have provided a shield for the 
challenged laws. 135  
 Admittedly, criminal law sometimes employs proxies for wrongdo-
ing. For example, there are criminal penalties for failure to comply 
with environmental recordkeeping and reporting requirements.136 
One justification for these penalties may be that these reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements are part of an enforcement scheme to 
prevent an underlying offense and that the best explanation for fail-
ure to meet the requirements is to conceal the occurrence of the un-
                                                                                                                  
 133. See Hessick, supra note 67, at 882 (collecting statements suggesting support of theory); 
see also Hamilton, supra note 60, at 548 (“[T]hose who seek harsh sentencing for child pornog-
raphy are really using a child pornography charge as a proxy for punishing child molestation.”). 
 134. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 684 (1962). 
 135. See id. 
 136. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(4) (2006) (It is a crime under the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act to fail to file any record, application, manifest, report, or other doc-
ument required to be maintained or filed by the Environmental Protection Agency). 




derlying offense. Failure to comply with the reporting and record-
keeping requirements acts as a proxy for engaging in some underly-
ing offense. Criminal penalties for failures to comply with record-
keeping and reporting requirements, however, are distinguishable 
from criminal penalties for child pornography possession. The unlaw-
ful possession of child pornography does not frustrate efforts to en-
force underlying laws against child sexual abuse. Child sexual abuse 
does not create an incentive to possess child pornography in the way 
discharging pollutants creates an incentive to falsely report the 
amount of pollutant discharged. Thus, there is not the same causal 
connection between the earlier wrongdoing and the later offense that 
might ground a correlation. 
 Nevertheless, punishing based on uncharged offenses is not alien 
to our criminal justice system. Under the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, offenders may be sentenced within the sentencing range of the 
offense they were convicted of based on the commission of uncharged 
offenses where those offenses are established by a preponderance of 
the evidence.137 The notion of using established offenses as proxies for 
unproven ones may strike some as contrary to notions of due pro-
cess.138 Using proxies that are imperfect, likewise, may strike some as 
pernicious.139 Nevertheless, if the correlation between possessing 
child pornography and committing past unpunished acts of child sex-
ual abuse is strong enough—establishing past wrongdoing beyond a 
reasonable doubt or perhaps by a preponderance of evidence—the 
penalties for child pornography possession could likely be justified 
from a retributivist perspective as proportional, at least under cer-
tain forms of retributivism.140 
 Existing evidence, however, supports only a weak correlation.141 A 
review of the existing social science research by the United States 
Sentencing Commission (U.S.S.C.) found that studies have shown 
                                                                                                                  
 137. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
For a thorough explanation of the relevant conduct guideline, see generally William W. 
Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495 (1990). 
 138. See Hessick, supra note 67, at 884 (faulting proxy punishment on ground that it 
permits criminal punishment without the constitutional protections generally afforded to 
criminal defendants). 
 139. See id. at 885. 
 140. The correlative harm theory might not satisfy a holder of communicative retribu-
tivism. Under communicative retributivism, an essential feature of justified punishment is 
the communication to the offender and the polity of the wrongness of the offender’s act. 
Such communication is impeded in cases where there is only a correlation between the 
criminalized conduct and the offender’s wrongful act. See R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, 
COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 80-81 (2001); Dan Markel, Retributive Justice and the 
Demands of Democratic Citizenship, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 38-39, 41-42 (2012). 
 141. See Hamilton, supra note 60, at 577-85. 
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substantially different prevalence rates of prior sexual contact of-
fenses among child pornography offenders.142 To rectify this, the 
U.S.S.C. performed its own study.143 It reviewed 1,654 possession 
cases filed in 2010.144 It found that 31.4% of offenders had prior con-
victions for sex offenses or a finding of a criminally sexually danger-
ous behavior (CSDB) in their presentencing report.145 Offenders with 
CSDB history receive sentences that are approximately twice as long 
as those without such a history.146 Only 26% of this subgroup, howev-
er, or 8% in total, had prior sexual contacts for which there was no 
conviction.147 The known rate of unpunished past acts is thus small. 
The study acknowledged that the actual rate of CSDB must be higher 
because incidents are systematically underreported.148 The U.S.S.C., 
however, offered no suggestion regarding the magnitude of the un-
derreporting. Furthermore, even if there are a very large number of 
unreported cases of child sexual abuse,149 it is unknown whether such 
acts are generally engaged in by a relatively small pool of individuals 
with a documented history of CSDB or a wider pool of individuals 
who have no such documented history. Thus, even when underreport-
ing is taken into account, it seems unlikely that high sentences are 
being systematically meted out to those offenders who have likely 
committed unpunished acts of child sexual abuse in the past.150 
                                                                                                                  
 142. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 62, at 169, 171-73. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 169. 
 145. Id. at 181. 
 146. Id. at 206.  
 147. Id. at 183 fig.7-2. 
 148. Id. at 179-80; see also PEGGY HEIL & KIM ENGLISH, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & 
REHAB., PRISON SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROGRAM 
IMPLEMENTATION 40 (2007) (“Official record data are woefully inadequate when it comes to 
reflecting an offender’s sex crime history . . . .” (citing Peggy Heil et al., Integration of Poly-
graph Testing with Sexual Offenders in the Colorado Department of Corrections, 29 
POLYGRAPH 26-35 (2002)). 
 149. See Ryan C.W. Hall & Richard C.W. Hall, A Profile of Pedophilia: Definition, 
Characteristics of Offenders, Recidivism, Treatment Outcomes, and Forensic Issues, 82 
MAYO CLINIC PROC. 457, 460-61 (2007) (noting that studies show that only an estimated 
one in twenty cases of child sexual abuse is reported or identified and that an arrest was 
made in only 29% of reported juvenile sexual assaults). 
 150. See JANIS WOLAK ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, CHILD-
PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSORS ARRESTED IN INTERNET-RELATED CRIMES: FINDINGS FROM THE 
NATIONAL JUVENILE ONLINE VICTIMIZATION STUDY 17 (2005), http://www.unh.edu/ 
ccrc/pdf/jvq/CV81.pdf [https://perma.cc/YXF7-X4A9] (finding in 84% of child pornography 
possession cases investigators did not detect concurrent child sexual victimization). 




D.   Market-Based Harms 
 The fourth theory of harm underlying child pornography offenses 
is the theory of market-based harms. Consider the offense of pos-
sessing or receiving stolen property. Buying an item that has been 
stolen obviously does not cause the owner to be deprived of the 
item—the item has already been appropriated. If, however, nobody 
bought stolen goods, undoubtedly far fewer items would be stolen. 
Receiving stolen goods, it is said, creates a market for them.151 
Likewise, it seems safe to say, if there were no demand to possess 
child pornography, the production of child pornography would be 
substantially curtailed.152 
 Receiving a child pornographic image through a noncommercial 
P2P file serving network, however, is not like purchasing a stolen car 
part. A stolen car part might be acquired directly from either a thief 
or a fence. Thieves and fences are repeat players in the market for 
stolen goods. In order to stay in business, they must replace items 
they have sold or transferred. Buying a stolen car part thus directly 
stimulates the “production” of stolen car parts. In contrast, because 
digital images can be reproduced endlessly and costlessly, stock is 
never depleted. Acquiring an image does not create the demand for a 
new pornographic image to be produced. The usual rules of supply and 
demand that undergird markets and drive production do not apply to 
child pornography. 
 Nor does a person, by downloading a child pornographic image 
through a P2P file sharing network, in any meaningful sense, signal 
the existence of a demand for the production of new child pornogra-
phy. As any user of Napster or LimeWire knows, individuals in file-
sharing databases may be wholly unaware when their data is being 
accessed. To the extent they are aware, they have little incentive to 
meet this perceived demand through the production of new child por-
nography. The supply of child pornography is already great enough to 
satisfy the demands of most offenders. There are already over five 
million unique child pornographic images on the Internet.153 Even the 
largest collectors possess only a fraction of the existing supply.154 
Furthermore, in the context of the enormous online trade in child 
pornography, the marginal impact of one person downloading child 
                                                                                                                  
 151. See Stuart P. Green, Thieving and Receiving: Overcriminalizing the Possession of 
Stolen Property, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 35, 46 (2011) (discussing the forward-looking as-
pects of receiving stolen property). 
 152. Two-thirds of federal production cases involve production for possession of the pro-
ducer only. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 62, at 265 fig.9-11. It may be supposed that 
the average volume in such cases is less than that in cases of production for distribution. 
 153. Id. at 107. 
 154. Id. (“[S]ome offenders possess over one million images of child pornography.”). 
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pornography on the overall demand for child pornography cannot be 
thought to be significant. As one court critical of the market-based 
harms theory has recognized, “[t]he worldwide market for child por-
nography is so vast that the relative market impact of 600 additional 
images [possessed by the defendant] is minuscule.”155 
E.   Norm-Undermining Harms 
 Here is what may be a more plausible theory of how possessing 
child pornography causes harm. According to the norm-undermining 
theory, by participating in Internet communities in which members 
share child pornography, possessors normalize and validate the sex-
ual exploitation of children, and this validation leads to child abuse. 
The U.S.S.C. Report explains: 
 Child pornography communities seek to make the viewing of 
sexualized images of children acceptable and implicitly or explicit-
ly condone sexual contact with children. Typical cognitive distor-
tions include denying that children suffer harm from sexual con-
tact, suggesting that children receive a benefit, condemning those 
who condemn, and “appealing to higher loyalties,” for example, by 
likening the struggle for pedophile acceptance to a socially ac-
ceptable cause such as the advancement of civil rights. 
 Child pornography communities can be social and supportive 
environments. In these communities, a child pornography offender 
can develop relationships with others who share his interests. One 
child pornography offender posted on a child pornography commu-
nity bulletin board, “[f]or many of us, this is our social life. We can 
discuss our feelings here and feel a part of something without fear 
of being condemned by society for our feelings and beliefs.” Rela-
tionships in child pornography communities can be emotionally 
gratifying and may escalate the level of offending. Offenders re-
ceive reinforcement and support by finding that others are trading 
images depicting sexual activity with children. Research also sug-
gests that online communities help child pornography offenders to 
develop positive feelings about their own deviant online sexual 
identities. As their online sexual identities become dominant, will-
ingness to comply with cultural and societal norms may erode.156 
                                                                                                                  
 155. United States v. Manke, No. 09-CR-172, 2010 WL 307937, at *4, *6, *8 (E.D. Wis. 
Jan. 19, 2010) (sentencing defendant to one day despite range of forty-one to fifty-one months’ 
imprisonment available); see also United States v. Raby, No. 2:05-CR-00003, 2009 WL 
5173964, at *7 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 30, 2009) (“The de minimis market effect of a few hundred 
images simply does not justify sentencing a man to [an] additional decade in prison.”); United 
States v. Goldberg, No. 05 CR 0922, 2008 WL 4542957, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2008) (noting 
that downloading of child pornography “does sustain a market for child pornography, . . . but 
that market is unfortunately there regardless of what may happen to” the defendant). 
 156. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 62, at 97 (footnotes omitted). 




Condoning, it is implied, leads to committing. But undoubtedly, one 
person’s downloading of child pornographic images through a P2P 
network can have no appreciable effect on another’s propensity to 
transgress the societal norm against sexually abusing children. One 
person cannot make a community, nor can one act establish or dises-
tablish a norm. Whatever effect the sharing of child pornography has 
must be based on the cumulative acts of many, rather than on the 
conduct of an individual defendant. 
F.   Perpetuation Harms 
 The possession of contraband in some cases perpetuates an exist-
ing harm. The receiving of stolen property is criminalized, at least in 
part, because a person who has purchased stolen property perpetu-
ates the owner’s original deprivation of property.157 If the stolen item 
were not purchased, it might be abandoned by the seller and eventu-
ally find its way home. More importantly, by possessing the stolen 
property, the receiver makes it harder for the owner to regain the 
stolen item. In many instances, the receiver of stolen property is a 
person without a criminal background.158 He is less likely to come 
under the scrutiny of the police than the initial thief or, in some cas-
es, subsequent fence.159 With the stolen property in the hands of the 
receiver, it is less likely that it will be recovered by the police and re-
turned to its rightful owner.160 Also, the receiver arguably breaches a 
moral duty to notify the owner or police of the location of the property 
so that it might be recovered. The law often places affirmative duties 
on those who have a unique relationship to the victim or to the initial 
injury.161 Once he gains control of the item, the receiver is in a unique 
position to return the item to its owner. A moral duty to return the 
item might be hypothesized. 
 The possession of child pornography, it has been contended, like-
wise perpetuates the original wrong done to the child-victim by the 
                                                                                                                  
 157. See STUART P. GREEN, THIRTEEN WAYS TO STEAL A BICYCLE: THEFT LAW IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 187-88 (2012). 
 158. See Michael Sutton, Stolen Goods Markets, CTR. FOR PROBLEM-ORIENTED 
POLICING, UNIV. OF N.Y. AT ALBANY (2010), http://www.popcenter.org/problems/pdfs/ 
stolen_goods.pdf [https://perma.cc/JYX7-9N4W]. 
 159. See Id. 
 160. See Id. 
 161. Parents, for example, have affirmative duties to their children, the violation of which 
may subject them to criminal sanctions. See Mark Theoharis, Child Abuse: Laws & Criminal 
Penalties, CRIM. DEF. LAW., http://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/crime-penalties/ 
federal/Child-Abuse.htm [https://perma.cc/7QFY-VG7R]. Those who cause an injury have an 
affirmative duty to prevent its aggravation. Vincent R. Johnson & Claire G. Hargrove, The 
Tort Duty of Parents to Protect Minor Children, 51 VILL. L. REV. 311, 317-18 (2006). 
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producer of the pornographic image.162 The primary harm to the 
child-subject of child pornography is caused directly by the sexual 
abuse accompanying the production of the pornographic image. The 
possession and viewing of the pornographic image may be conceived 
of as a secondary injury inextricably connected with the first. This 
secondary injury is a privacy violation.163 It has two aspects—one 
subjective and one objective.  
1.   Subjective Aspect 
 The first aspect is the subjective aspect. I refer to it as “subjective” 
because actual knowledge by the victim is involved. A common means 
by which subjects of child pornography learn that their image has 
been widely distributed is through notification by a federal prosecu-
tor that a pornographic image of them has been found in the posses-
sion of a member of a P2P file-sharing network. Such notification is 
provided for by statute, as is an opt-out provision.164 There is a well-
documented psychological harm suffered by the victim as a result of 
their “grow[ing] up knowing that there are images of [themselves] 
being sexually abused which are available in perpetuity.”165 Victims 
believe the images of their abuse are being used for sexual gratifica-
tion; that those images may be used to groom other child victims; 
that they may be recognized by acquaintances or strangers as the 
subject of the abusive images; and that they may be stalked.166 As a 
result, victims experience poor self-esteem, depression, shame, guilt, 
humiliation, delinquency, suicidal thoughts, and post-traumatic 
                                                                                                                  
 162. See, e.g., Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L. REV. 
847, 862 (2008). 
 163. In many cases, this privacy violation is the only injury suffered by the child-
subject of the pornography. Approximately 25% of the child-subjects of child pornography 
are unharmed in the production of the pornography because they are either aware that 
their image is being captured or are not being sexually abused. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
supra note 63, at 110-11; see also Janis Wolak et al.,  Arrests for Child Pornography Pro-
duction: Data at Two Time Points from a National Sample of U.S. Law Enforcement Agen-
cies, 16 CHILD MALTREATMENT 184, 190 (2011). 
 164. The Crime Victims’ Rights Act provides that federal crime victims are enti-
tled to reasonable notice of public court proceedings. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(2) (2012). In 
cases of minor victims, a representative may enforce the victim’s rights. Id. § 3771(e). 
After being notified, a victim may opt in or opt out of notifications in future cases. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY VICTIM 
ASSISTANCE (CPVA): A REFERENCE FOR VICTIMS AND PARENT/GUARDIAN OF VICTIMS,  
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/cpva.pdf/view [https://perma.cc/2BMM-HJYG]. 
 165. Tink Palmer, Behind the Screen: Children Who Are the Subjects of Abusive Images, 
in VIEWING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET: UNDERSTANDING THE OFFENCE, 
MANAGING THE OFFENDER, HELPING THE VICTIMS 71 (Ethel Quayle & Max Taylor eds., 2005). 
 166. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 62, at 113-14. 




stress disorder.167 The Supreme Court has recognized that harms of 
this sort are a major reason why child pornography is outlawed.168 
 The producer of child pornography is obviously responsible for 
the psychological harm suffered by the victim as a result of learning 
that images of his abuse are in wide circulation. Like the psycholog-
ical harms suffered by the victim as a result of being sexually 
abused in the course of the production of the images, the psycholog-
ical harms suffered as a result of learning the images are in wide 
circulation are easily foreseeable. The responsibility of a typical 
possessor of child pornography, however, is another matter. There 
is no reason to believe that the typical possessor of child pornogra-
phy desires to inflict psychological harm upon the subject of the im-
ages. Responsibility there is a matter of foreseeability. As discussed 
below, there are many reasons why, for the typical possessor, there 
is a low degree of foreseeability that his possession will cause signif-
icant unjustified psychological harm. 
 First, the possession of child pornography is wide-spread and, de-
spite the increased number of prosecutions, the likelihood of any in-
dividual user being apprehended is low.169 Individual possessors of 
child pornography can be expected to know this. Therefore, they 
would likely not foresee their possession of child pornography leading 
to the notification of a victim. 
 Second, pornographic images are widely circulated. It is not unu-
sual for child pornography victims to receive multiple court notifica-
tions each week.170 An individual possessor may reasonably think 
that if he is apprehended and a subject of a pornographic image he 
possesses is identified, it is unlikely that he is the first person appre-
hended with the image. He might reasonably believe that notification 
                                                                                                                  
 167. Id. at 113. Describing one instance, the Supreme Court stated: 
The full extent of this victim’s suffering is hard to grasp. Her abuser took away 
her childhood, her self-conception of her innocence, and her freedom from the kind 
of nightmares and memories that most others will never know. These crimes were 
compounded by the distribution of images of her abuser’s horrific acts, which 
meant the wrongs inflicted upon her were in effect repeated; for she knew her hu-
miliation and hurt were and would be renewed into the future as an ever-
increasing number of wrongdoers witnessed the crimes committed against her. 
Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1717 (2014). 
 168. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758-59 (1982). 
 169. Approximately 250,000 individuals in the Unites States may be possessors of child 
pornography. Janis Wolak et al., Measuring a Year of Child Pornography Trafficking by 
U.S. Computers on a Peer-to-Peer Network, 38 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 347, 354 (2014). 
In 2006, there were under 4,000 arrests for child pornography possession. See Janis Wolak, 
David Finkelhor & Kimberly Mitchell, Child Pornography Possessors: Trends in Offender 
and Case Characteristics, 23 SEXUAL ABUSE 22, 22 (2011). Even if the number of arrests 
has doubled, the odds of apprehension would only be 3 out of 100. 
 170. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 62, at 116. 
2017]  CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND PROPORTIONALITY 1359 
  
of his possession will not significantly change the victim’s knowledge 
about their image being possessed by many through the Internet; at 
most, it will confirm what the victim already knows. 
 Third, a possessor of an image of child pornography might reasona-
bly believe that even if his possession causes or confirms a victim’s 
knowledge that an image is in wide circulation, the moral significance 
of this is diminished because the victim would likely have gained such 
knowledge eventually based on notification that another in the P2P 
network was apprehended with the image in his possession. 
 Fourth, even in cases where a notification produced or confirmed 
knowledge that would not otherwise have been occurred, the produc-
ing or confirming of that knowledge does not appear unjustified. Peo-
ple may reasonably be presumed to want to know that their image is 
in circulation, despite the pain that this knowledge may cause. Con-
gress’s recognition of this presumption explains its providing for vic-
tim notification in the Crime Victim’s Rights Act.171 Though the 
choice might be difficult, one can easily imagine a case where a third-
party discovers a pornographic image of an identifiable child and 
chooses to inform the subject or their guardian. The psychological 
harm produced is more than offset by the valued knowledge. 
 Fifth, it will more frequently be the case that a notification will 
only remind a subject of child pornography of the known fact that the 
image is in circulation. The marginal impact of every additional noti-
fication might be compared to being reminded of the recent death of a 
loved one. The reminder may be painful, but it is not the sort of inju-
ry that generally warrants criminalization of the conduct producing 
such pain. Much less do such reminders warrant the significant pen-
alties meted out for child pornography possession. 
 Finally, a possessor of child pornography might reasonably believe 
that if notification had the potential for creating substantial psycho-
logical harm, the victim would opt out of the notification scheme ra-
ther than suffer its effects.172 
                                                                                                                  
 171. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 172. The Supreme Court recently considered a case raising the question to what ex-
tent a possessor of child pornography is legally responsible for privacy-violation injuries. 
The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, § 2259, requires district courts to award resti-
tution for certain federal criminal offenses, including child-pornography possession. In 
Paroline v. United States, the Supreme Court interpreted the Act to limit restitution to 
those losses proximately caused by the conduct for which the defendant was convicted. 
134 S. Ct. 1710, 1721-22 (2014). The Court concluded that the defendant should be re-
quired to pay the victim a “reasonable and circumscribed award[,]” more than a “token or 
nominal amount[,]” but less than a “severe” amount, to be determined by a court employ-
ing “discretion and sound judgment.” Id. at 1727-28. While the Court engaged in an 
analysis of the causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and victim’s loss, its 
conclusion ultimately rested on evaluations of Congressional intent regarding various 
 




2.   Objective Aspect 
 It may also be argued that subjects of child pornography have an 
“objective interest” in not having the image of their abuse viewed and 
that the wrongful violation of that interest provides the basis for the 
penalties for child pornography possession. An “objective interest” in 
not having an image viewed is one that is violated by a viewing even 
if the subject of the image never becomes subjectively aware of the 
viewing. Certainly, victims of child pornography would not want the 
images of their abuse viewed even if they were never to learn of it. The 
interests the criminal law most commonly protect are interests which, 
when violated, affect the victim subjectively. Paradigm crimes such as 
assault, robbery, rape, theft, and kidnapping involve acts of the perpe-
trator of which the victim almost always subjectively aware. When 
these crimes occur, the victim generally experiences pain, fear, loss, 
confinement, etc. Of course, there are exceptions. An unconscious per-
son may be raped and be unaware of the violation of his or her sexual 
autonomy. Theft occurs even if the stolen property’s owner never no-
tices the item is missing. Criminal trespass can occur without the 
landowner’s knowledge. While these examples may be explained as 
unavoidable overbreadth, it seems equally plausible that they repre-
                                                                                                                  
policy goals relevant to restitution. Id. at 1724. With respect to the underlying moral 
question of whether a possessor of child pornography should be held responsible for the 
privacy violation harms suffered by a child-victim, the Court merely opined, “[T]here is a 
real question whether holding a single possessor liable for millions of dollars in losses 
collectively caused by thousands of independent actors might be excessive and dispropor-
tionate in these circumstances.” Id. at 1726. 
The Court in Paroline offered a range of factors that it believed district courts should 
take into account when attempting to determine an appropriate restitution award. Id. at 
1728. Those factors were (1) “the amount of the victim’s losses caused by the continuing 
traffic in the victim’s images,” (2) “the number of past criminal defendants found to have 
contributed to the victim’s general losses,” (3) “the number of future offenders likely to be 
caught and convicted for crimes contributing to the victim’s general losses,” (4) the broader 
number of offenders involved in possessing pornographic materials of the victim, (5) 
“whether the defendant reproduced or distributed images of the victim,” (6) “whether the 
defendant had any connection to the initial production of the images,” (7) “how many imag-
es of the victim the defendant possessed,” and (8) “other facts relevant to the defendant’s 
relative causal role.” Id. Interestingly, although the Court identified as a factor “the num-
ber of past criminal defendants found to have contributed to the victim’s general losses,” 
the Court did not specifically identify as factors either (a) when the defendant acquired the 
images, or (b) when the victim learned that the defendant acquired the images, relative to 
the time that the victim suffered losses or incurred expenses. Id. at 1728. Thus, it is not 
clear whether the Supreme Court believed that, as a bright-line rule, a defendant should 
pay no restitution for losses occurring before the victim learned of the defendant’s posses-
sion. If not, the Court’s interpretation of the Act’s causation requirement would be exceed-
ingly loose and open-ended. As the term “cause” is generally used, conduct cannot have 
caused harm that was suffered before the conduct occurred.  
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sent the criminal law’s recognition of objective interests as worthy  
of protection.173 
 Assuming that individuals have legally protectable objective inter-
ests in not having child pornographic images of them viewed, the ques-
tion is how strong this interest is. The strength of an objective interest 
might be determined by asking how strongly a person would object if 
he knew of the violation. A person would likely object as much to being 
raped while unconscious as to being raped while conscious. To engage 
in a broad generalization, it seems plausible that the victim of child 
pornography would object as much to the subsequent circulation and 
viewing of the images as to their initial production. 
 The harder question concerns the gravity of the violation caused 
by a particular possessor. Child pornography is typically circulated 
widely through P2P file sharing networks. An image may be viewed 
by hundreds or thousands of persons. A person might be relatively 
indifferent to having an image viewed by N or N+1 persons, where N 
is a large number. It is the fact that the number is large, rather than 
the number itself that is disturbing. The marginal viewing of an im-
age by any particular possessor would not significantly impinge on 
the objective interest of the subject of the image. In such a case, view-
ing by a particular possessor would not significantly violate the objec-
tive interest in not having an image viewed. 
 If nothing else, the analysis above demonstrates that justifying 
punishment based on the objective aspect of the harm perpetuation 
theory is like justifying punishment based on the market-based harm 
theory, the norm-undermining theory, and the subjective aspect of 
the harm perpetuation theory: The justifications falter because the 
marginal impact of an individual defendant’s acts are de minimis. 
Lacking significant consequences in themselves, individual acts of 
possession seem to provide little basis for punishment. 
V.   HARMLESS WRONGDOING AND CHILD PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSION 
 The previous Part considered whether there are harms, either 
caused or risked by the possessor of child pornography, that might 
render the penalties inflicted upon the possessor proportional from 
the perspective of negative retributivism. No such harms were identi-
fied. Does that mean that the penalties for child pornography posses-
sion are justified, if at all, only from a strictly utilitarian perspective? 
There is little doubt that, simply as a statistical matter, a person who 
possesses child pornography is at least somewhat more likely to en-
                                                                                                                  
 173. See generally JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW VOL. 1: 
HARM TO OTHERS 79-89 (1984) (discussing whether persons can have interests that are 
harmed after they die). 




gage in child sexual abuse than a randomly chosen person.174 Perhaps 
the strategy behind the criminalization of child pornography is simp-
ly to “cast the net wide,” and haul in and imprison as many potential 
child sexual abusers as possible. To be sure, many offenders would be 
imprisoned who would never have sexually abused children. The the-
ory, however, would be that the cost of such unnecessary imprison-
ment is outweighed by the cost of the child sexual abuse that would 
have occurred absent the imprisonment.175 
 Before conceding that the penalties for child pornography posses-
sion are proportionate only when viewed from a utilitarian perspec-
tive, I would like to consider an alternative retributive justification—
one that does not rest on the proposition that the possessor of child 
pornography has caused or risked substantial harms either by pos-
sessing child pornography or by having sexually abused children in 
the past. Since retributivists are committed to the idea that punish-
ment is deserved only for wrongdoing, the challenge is to identify 
wrongdoing by the possessor of child pornography that is not a mat-
ter of causing or risking harm. Such wrongdoing might be referred to 
as harmless, or nonconsequential, wrongdoing. 
A.   Contribution as Wrongdoing 
 This Section examines one theory of nonconsequential wrongdoing 
according to which possessors of child pornography may deserve to be 
punished. The theory is that those who possess child pornography 
typically have contributed to the sexual abuse of children and that 
such contribution is a form of wrongdoing justifying their punish-
ment. As I shall use the term, an act “contributes” to a harm when (1) 
the act is not a but-for cause of the harm, (2) absent one or more oth-
er contributing factors, the act would have been a but-for cause of the 
harm, and (3) the presence of other causal factors does not preempt 
the act. Thus, for example, if two individuals simultaneously shoot a 
victim in the heart, each shot contributes to the death of the victim 
because (1) neither is a but-for cause—the other shot by itself would 
have been fatal; (2) absent the other shot, each shot would have been 
a but-for cause of the death; and, (3) since the shots were simultane-
ous and one bullet did not kill the victim first, neither shot was 
preempted. Acts that contribute to harms are also known as “concur-
rent causes” of the harm. 
                                                                                                                  
 174. As discussed, supra in Section IV.B., there is considerable controversy regarding the 
extent and strength of the correlation between possession of child pornography and sexual 
abuse of children. Common sense, however, would expect some positive, nonzero correlation. 
 175. There is, of course, a serious question whether such a strategy can in fact be justi-
fied from a utilitarian perspective. See supra Part III (discussing the dangerousness of 
child pornography possessors, both relative to population in general and in absolute terms). 
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 A further bit of terminology is needed. There are two types of con-
tributing causes: sufficient and insufficient contributing causes. A 
sufficient contributing cause (also known as a “duplicative cause”) is 
one which would have been sufficient to cause the result even with-
out the contribution of the other factors.176 Each shot in the example 
above would be a sufficient contributing cause because each shot 
alone was enough to have killed the victim. In contrast, an insuffi-
cient contributing cause is a contributing cause that would not by 
itself be sufficient to cause the harm.177 For example, A, B, and C 
each independently add twenty-five units of a poison to a person’s 
drink; forty units of poison are needed to cause death. The adding of 
each dose is a contributing cause pursuant to the earlier definition 
and an insufficient contributing cause because twenty-five units alone 
would not kill. The intuitive idea of an insufficient contributing cause 
is that it is one among many small factors that together—in aggre-
gate—bring about some harm.  
 Typical individual instances of possession of child pornography ar-
guably contribute to social harm in three ways. First, they contribute 
to the perception that there is an economic demand for child pornogra-
phy that leads to the actual production of child pornography. Second, 
they contribute to the perception that pedophilia is a wide-spread and 
socially acceptable phenomenon, which in turn leads to child sexual 
abuse. Third, they contribute to the privacy violations that lead to the 
psychological harms experienced by the subjects of child pornography. 
Individual instances of possession of child pornography, however, are 
insufficient contributing causes of the production of child pornography, 
child sexual abuse, and privacy violations. This is so because individu-
al instances of such acts, absent the contributing effects of other in-
stances of possession, will rarely be but-for causes. Market demand is 
not increased by a single act of acquisition of child pornography; socie-
tal norms against child sexual abuse are not undermined by individual 
acts; and psychological harms do not accrue based on individual acts. 
All of these harms are aggregate ones.178  
 Ascribing responsibility for harms based on an actor’s insufficient 
contribution is familiar from tort law. The tort of negligence requires 
unreasonably risky conduct that causes harm.179 Torts cases have 
recognized that the causation requirement can be satisfied by con-
duct that is an insufficient contribution to harm.180 Likewise, the Re-
                                                                                                                  
 176. David A. Fischer, Successive Causes and the Enigma of Duplicated Harm, 66 
TENN. L. REV. 1127, 1134, 1145 (1999). 
 177. David A. Fischer, Insufficient Causes, 94 KY. L.J. 277, 278 (2005-06). 
 178. See discussion supra in Part IV. 
 179. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 499 (2011). 
 180. See, e.g., Landers v. E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. 1952). 




statement of Torts creates liability for actors whose tortious conduct 
contributes to harm.181 Thus, for example, where multiple defendants 
tortiously discharge toxic chemicals into a river, each might be at 
least partially liable for downstream crop failure, even if none of the 
discharges were but-for causes of the crop failure.182 
 In contrast, the criminal law has not clearly accepted a notion of 
causation that includes insufficient contributory causes. The Model 
Penal Code appears to define causation solely in terms of but-for cau-
sation. According to section 2.03(1), “Conduct is the cause of a result 
when . . . it is an antecedent but for which the result in question 
would not have occurred.”183 The Model Penal Code Commentaries, 
however, instruct that this section is to be interpreted to permit suf-
ficient concurrent causes to qualify as the cause of a result.184 The 
Commentaries are silent regarding insufficient concurrent causes. At 
an annual meeting, the American Law Institute declined to extend 
causation to insufficient concurrent causes.185 In contrast, a handful 
of states’ courts have adopted “substantial factor” or “contributing 
factor” tests for causation in the context of the criminal law.186 Under 
                                                                                                                  
 181. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL  
HARM § 27 (AM. LAW INST. 2005) (“If multiple acts occur, each of which under § 26 alone 
would have been a factual cause of the physical harm at the same time in the absence of 
the other act(s), each act is regarded as a factual cause of the harm.”). While it is uncontro-
versial that insufficient contributing causes may sometimes be subject to tort liability, 
liability is less clear in those cases where the other contributing causes are nontortious. 
See Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1798 (1985) (“Courts 
generally absolve the defendant from liability if he proves that the injury would have oc-
curred anyway as a result of independent nontortious conditions.”). 
 182. See generally Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d. 1 (1st Cir. 1986) (defendants 
were sued for contaminating the city’s water supply, resulting in serious injury and death 
to individuals). 
 183. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 184. Id. § 2.03 cmt. 2. 
 185. See AM. LAW INST., 39th Annual Meeting Proceedings, 39 A.L.I. PROC. 135, 135-141 
(1962). 
 186. See People v. Jennings, 237 P.3d 474, 496 (Cal. 2010); Eversley v. State, 748 So. 
2d 963, 967 (Fla. 1999) (dictum); People v. Bailey, 549 N.W.2d 325, 334 (Mich. 1996); State 
v. Christman, 249 P.3d 600, 687 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011); Commonwealth v. Osachuk, 681 
N.E.2d 292, 294 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997); see also Bailey, 549 N.W.2d at 334 (“If a certain act 
was a substantial factor in bringing about the loss of human life, it is not prevented from 
being a proximate cause of this result by proof of the fact that it alone would not have re-
sulted in death, nor by proof that another contributory cause would have been fatal even 
without the aid of this act.” (quoting PERKINS & BAILEY, CRIMINAL LAW 783 (3d ed.)). Cf. 
Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 890-91 (2014) (rejecting the government’s argument 
that the result from penalty enhancement under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 
841(b)(1)(C), applied to conduct that was an insufficient concurrent cause of death). 
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such tests, at least some conduct that was an insufficient concurrent 
cause would support criminal liability for result offenses.187 
 Existing tort and criminal law aside, should one be held criminally 
responsible for harms in which one’s conduct is merely an insufficient 
concurrent cause? Desert is a matter of culpability for wrongful con-
duct. Thus, the strongest case for criminal responsibility for a harm 
that one merely contributed to would be where an actor engaged in 
the conduct that was an insufficient contributory cause of harm with 
greatest moral fault. For example, A, B, and C each independently, 
and without knowledge of the other, add twenty-five units of poison 
to V’s drink, mistakenly believing twenty-five units is sufficient to 
kill V. In fact, forty units are needed. A, B, and C act with the pur-
pose of killing V. Having a purpose to kill establishes a high degree of 
moral fault. Should each be liable for murder based on V’s death? 
This question is analogous to the question of whether there should be 
liability for so-called “unknowingly justified” acts, such as malicious-
ly burning the field of a neighbor without knowing that the burning 
of the field creates a firebreak that saves a town, or arresting a dan-
gerous person without probable cause.188 In both cases of contributory 
causation and unknowingly justified conduct, there is an occurrence 
of harm. There is also conduct which, if its nature were fully appreci-
ated, would not make the actor morally blameworthy. It is not moral-
ly blameworthy to knowingly engage in justified conduct, nor is it 
morally blameworthy to knowingly engage in conduct that is merely 
a contributory cause of harm. Contributory conduct by definition is 
not a but-for cause of harm. If you know you are not making the situ-
ation worse for anyone by your conduct, and there are no other rele-
vant moral considerations, how can you be morally blameworthy? 
Because there are some good arguments in the literature that un-
knowingly justified conduct should at most be punished as an at-
tempt, 189 the same would go for conduct that is merely a contributory 
cause. In the example above, A, B, and C should merely be liable for 
                                                                                                                  
 187. See also Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 890-91 (rejecting the government’s argument that the 
“result from” penalty enhancement under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 
841(b)(1)(C), applied to conduct that was an insufficient concurrent cause of death). 
 188. Larry Alexander, Unknowingly Justified Actors and the Attempt/Success Distinc-
tion, 39 TULSA L. REV. 851, 854 (2004). 
 189. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1993); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE 
GENERAL PART 23-27 (2d ed. 1961); Andrew Ashworth, Belief, Intent and Criminal Liability, 
in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE, 1, 28 (Eekelaar & Bell eds. 1987); Paul H. Robinson, 
Competing Theories of Justification: Deeds v. Reasons, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 45 (A.P.  
Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996); Robert F. Schopp, Justification Defenses and Just Con-
victions, 24 PAC. L.J. 1233, 1267-82 (1993); B. Sharon Byrd, Wrongdoing and Attribution: 
Implications Beyond the Justification-Excuse Distinction, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1289, 1314-16 
(1987). 




attempted murder. There would be criminal responsibility for the 
trying to kill, not for the death itself. 
 The case for holding those who possess child pornography crimi-
nally responsible for the harms that their conduct merely contributes 
to is considerably weaker than the case for holding A, B, and C in the 
example above liable for murder. This is so because the moral fault of 
those who possess child pornography is considerably less. As dis-
cussed, tort recognizes liability based on causal contribution. Yet, a 
predicate for such liability is negligence. In cases of multiple actors, 
such as factories that discharge pollutants into a river, it is usually 
assumed that each actor is unaware of the others’ jointly causally 
sufficient contributions and believes, or should believe, that his con-
duct creates an unreasonable risk of being a but-for cause of harm. In 
contrast, in the case of possession of child pornography, there is no 
culpability based on an unreasonable risk creation. A reasonable per-
son in the possessor’s situation would be aware that he is just one 
among a multitude of possessors whose conduct overdetermines the 
existing harmful (1) levels of demand for child pornography, (2) levels 
of the sexualization of children, and (3) scope of distribution of a par-
ticular image of child pornography. A reasonable person would not 
believe that his conduct creates a substantial risk of being the but-for 
cause of these things.190 To this, it may be responded that no risk, 
however small, is justified. While sometimes risk creation can be jus-
tified by the utility of the conduct creating the risk,191 the ostensible 
pleasure derived by the possessor of child pornography can have no 
justificatory weight as it either reflects bad character or is a form of 
unjust enrichment; and therefore the possessor is morally culpable 
for the creation of even a small risk of being a but-for cause of harm. 
Even assuming the validity of this response, however, the low level of 
moral culpability of the possessor, coupled with the small degree of 
causal contribution associated with his conduct, seem inconsistent 
with the sizeable penalties associated with child pornography. 
B.   Intrinsic Wrongdoing 
 The previous Section explored the theory that by virtue of con-
tributing to a certain type of harm, the actor should be held crimi-
nally responsible for the harm to some degree. In contrast, this Sec-
tion explores theories according to which certain types of acts are 
                                                                                                                  
 190. Cf. Alastair Norcross, Puppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal 
Cases, 18 PHIL. PERSP.: ETHICS 229, 231 (2004) (arguing that an individual’s personal 
conduct in eating meat has a sufficient probability of causing animal suffering to render 
it morally unacceptable). 
 191. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 
cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 2009). 
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wrongful even in the absence of an actual harm to which they may 
be causally connected. 
 1.   Law-Breaking 
 While consensus is not universal, many scholars support the view 
that there is a prima facie moral duty to obey the law.192 This duty 
may be referred to as “political obligation.” Political obligation has 
been argued to rest on considerations of consent, gratitude, fair play, 
association, and natural law.193 The breach of an obligation normally 
establishes moral culpability. Accordingly, if the existence of political 
obligation is assumed, it would be permissible from a retributivism 
perspective to punish a person who runs a red light, even when such 
conduct does not cause or risk harm.194 The possessor of child pornog-
raphy has breached his obligation to obey the law.195 Can the penal-
ties established by child pornography possession law be found pro-
portional due to the moral culpability intrinsic in their breach and 
without reference to any of the consequential (or correlated) harms 
generally associated with the possession of child pornography? 
 I am aware of, and I advance, no general theory regarding what 
sort of punishments might be justified based on the breach of one’s 
political obligation.196 I am skeptical, however, that the penalties 
                                                                                                                  
 192. A recent and articulate defense of this position is advanced by Dan Markel. Mar-
kel, supra note 140 (limiting its defense to laws that are neither illiberal or spectacularly 
dumb); see also THOMAS CHRISTIANO, THE CONSTITUTION OF EQUALITY: DEMOCRATIC 
AUTHORITY AND ITS LIMITS 244 (2008); H.L.A HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN 
JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 145 (1982); Scott J. Shapiro, Authority, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 382, 434-39 (Jules Coleman 
& Scott Shapiro eds., 2002); J.D. Mabbott, Punishment, 48 MIND 152, 155 (1939); M.B.E. 
Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 YALE L.J. 950 (1973); Jer-
emy Waldron, Kant’s Legal Positivism, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1535 (1996). 
 193. See Richard Dagger & David Lefkowitz, Political Obligation, in STAN. ENCYC. OF  
PHIL. §4, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-obligation/ [https://perma.cc/BZ8Z-3JSE]. 
 194. Here, I assume that punishment is deserved for moral culpability that does not 
involve harm causing or risking and that criminal penalties may be an appropriate form of 
punishment. This, I think, is a fair assumption. Joel Feinberg, who in general would limit 
the criminal law to penalizing acts harmful to others, allows for the punishment of free-
riders as a “mediating maxim for the application of the harm principle.” FEINBERG, supra 
note 173, at 244. There is a close relationship between free-riding and breaching the duty 
of fair play, which many believe political obligation is grounded on. 
 195. In exceptional cases where the law violator neither knew nor should have known 
that the sort of conduct he was engaged in was unlawful, no moral culpability accompanies 
the violation. The typical child pornography possession defendant, however, was aware 
that he possessed child pornography unlawfully. P2P file sharing networks and Internet 
sites selling child pornography, one would assume, are generally configured in a manner to 
assure the user that their use will not be detectable by the authorities. 
 196. Concerning the severity of punishment appropriate for breaking a law not entail-
ing moral culpability, Dan Markel writes, “the wrong of unreasonably flouting democratic 
authority has to be measured against the social significance of the project involved and the 
 




meted out to possessors of child pornography can be justified as pro-
portionate based on the breach of the duty to obey the law. To my 
mind, the primary difficulty with such an approach is that the ap-
proach seems premised on a duty to obey the law that is general, ra-
ther than one that is a function of the content of the law.197 Such a 
duty would be equally breached in the case of running a red light 
when it clearly appeared safe to do so (a paradigmatic example of a 
harmless breach of political obligation) and the case of grievously as-
saulting a person. Yet comparable penalties for running a red light 
and assault would be unjust. Momentarily putting aside the culpabil-
ity based on breach of political obligation in both cases, the culpabil-
ity for running a red light when it appears clearly safe to do so is 
much less than the culpability for grievously assaulting another. Now 
taking into account the culpability based on political obligation, the 
total moral culpability of the traffic light runner is much less than 
the total culpability of the assaulter. Therefore her penalty should be 
less. Likewise, even when culpability for breaching a political obliga-
tion is taken into account, it appears disproportionate to impose 
criminal penalties on the possessor of child pornography that are 
comparable to those imposed in cases of criminal acts that directly 
cause or risk harm.198 
 Some have proposed that the strength of political obligation need 
not be uniform across all laws.199 The strength of one’s obligation 
with respect to any particular law, one might contend, varies with 
the degree to which considerations of consent, gratitude, fair play, 
association, and/or natural law, which support political obligation 
generally, apply to that law. Viewed from this perspective, child por-
nography possession laws appear to generate a relatively weak duty 
to obey. Consider the fair play theory of political obligation. Accord-
ing to this theory, “when a number of persons conduct any joint en-
terprise according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who 
have submitted to these restrictions when required have a right to a 
similar submission from those who have benefitted by their submis-
sion.”200 Applying this theory to specific laws such as stop sign re-
quirements or prohibitions of theft, a clear obligation exists because 
                                                                                                                  
degree of unreasonableness manifested by the defendant’s offense,” but concedes, “a politi-
cal retributivist account will tend to focus less on the amount of punishment in the abstract 
and more on whether the procedure for the determination of punishment was appropriate.” 
Markel, supra note 140, at 106-07. 
 197. See STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING AND STEALING 247 (2006) (arguing along 
similar lines that the disobedience theory fails to explain the penalties for tax evasion). 
 198. See supra text accompanying footnotes 104-11 supra (comparing penalties for 
child pornography possession and child sex abuse). 
 199. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 101-02 (1986). 
 200. H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights? 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 185 (1955). 
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most persons benefit from others complying with these laws. In con-
trast, those who typically violate child pornography possession 
laws—white males in their 40s201—derive no benefit from the opera-
tion of those laws. Few would seek to justify child pornography pos-
session laws on paternalistic grounds.202 Children, not adults, are the 
class intended to be protected by such laws. Indeed, because child 
pornography possession laws were not enacted on the federal level 
until the late 1970s,203 and opportunities to possess child pornogra-
phy before the Internet era were considerably limited, defendants 
today have derived limited protection from the laws they are now 
charged with violating. Furthermore, the strongest case for a fair 
play obligation to comply with a particular law would be when others 
comply with it out of a sense of fair play. (“Because others are stop-
ping at red lights based on the expectation that I and others will 
share in their respect for traffic laws, I should also.”) Although em-
pirical data is not available, it seems unlikely that there is a signifi-
cant population of individuals who refrain from possessing child por-
nography out of a sense of fair play. 
2.   Rule Consequentialism 
(a)   Generally 
 A better model for understanding child-pornography possession 
laws, I suggest, is to think of them in terms of rule consequentialism. 
According to rule consequentialism, acts are right insofar as they 
conform to rules that, if generally followed, would lead to desirable 
states of affairs.204 Acts thus can be obligatory even if in specific cases 
they produce no social benefits due the fact that they are not general-
ly followed. For example, telling the truth may be the right thing to 
do in a particular situation even if it would seem unjustified based on 
its consequences because truth-telling is, as a general matter, a de-
sirable social practice, or rule that should be followed. Conversely, 
wrongful acts might be thought of as acts that conform to rules that, 
if followed generally, would result in social harms, even if, in specific 
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instances, no social harm is caused. Acts that, if aggregated with oth-
er like acts, would produce social ills are thus identified as immoral.
 The moral intuition being appealed to here is not the usual one 
invoked in support of rule consequentialism. Rule consequentialism 
is usually defended as a decision procedure on the following ground: 
attempting to evaluate options in terms of their consequences on a 
case-by-case basis will inevitably result in relatively high rates of er-
roneous decisions and undesirable outcomes; in contrast, evaluating 
options as conforming or not to a generally consequentially justified 
rule will, over the long run, lead to superior outcomes.205 
 In contrast, I suggest that it is intrinsically wrong to act in ways 
that, if generally followed, would result in significant harm. The intu-
ition, appealing to a counterfactual generalization,206 is intended to 
have a Kantian flavor.207 A person acting inconsistently with the re-
quirements of rule consequentialism makes one of two moral errors. 
On one hand, she may fail to appreciate the morally objectionable 
consequences of others acting as she does. She may not appreciate, 
for example, how small impacts in aggregate may result in signifi-
cant consequences to innocent actors or appreciate that those conse-
quences are harmful ones that should not occur. On the other hand, 
she may believe without justification that she is entitled to act in 
ways that others are not—that she is in a privileged position and 
may violate a rule-consequentialist norm to which others should ad-
here. The belief that among one’s fellows, one may claim a morally 
superior position to pursue one’s self-interest is perhaps the funda-
mental moral error. 
                                                                                                                  
 205. RICHARD. B. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT 180 (1979). 
 206. Obviously, care must be taken when it comes to formulating the type of act that is 
to be generalized. It could not be contended that going to grocery store G at hour H is 
wrongdoing on the ground that if everyone went to grocery store G at hour H, there would 
be mass stampeding. Rather, the proper generalization would be along the lines of every-
one going to a grocery store at hour H (or some more broadly specified time period), which 
would not produce ill consequences. The problem of describing events at the proper level of 
generality is a common one in law. For example, whether a harm is “foreseeable” may turn 
on how specifically the event is described. The lack of a theory of act description for apply-
ing rule-consequentialism should be no more fatal for it than for the doctrine of proximate 
causation, which turns on the notion of foreseeability. 
 207. Kant famously stated: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the 
same time will that it should become a universal law.” IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR 
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 30 (1993) (trans. James W. Ellington 1993). Thus, Kant urged 
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willed, there is an imperfect duty. Thus, it might be argued that there is an imperfect duty 
not to possess child pornography in light of what would happen if the maxim to possess it 
were universalized. Cf. 1 DEREK PARFIT, ON WHAT MATTERS, ch. 16 (2011) (arguing that rule 
consequentialism can be derived from Kantian contractualism). 
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 Rule consequentialism, as I have characterized it, may be com-
pared to the moral objection to free-riding. Free-riders take ad-
vantage of the public goods generated by group activity without con-
tributing to the activity.208 Some have argued that free riding is im-
moral.209 In contrast, in order to act immorally from the perspective 
of rule consequentialism, it is not necessary that the actor derive a 
personal benefit from the public activity in which he does not partici-
pate. Rule consequentialism thus supports more extensive moral ob-
ligations than a free-rider moral theory. For example, imagine a vil-
lage bordering a lake. All members of the village depend on the lake 
for fish. It is determined that, in order to avoid ruinous overfishing, 
fishing must be curtailed for a year. On this ground, virtually all 
members of the village voluntarily abstain. To fish when others ab-
stain, and then to enjoy the benefits of a well-stocked lake, may be 
thought immoral as it amounts to free-riding on the restraint of oth-
ers. In contrast, imagine that continued fishing of the lake would 
cause the fishing stock of only future generations to be depleted and 
that only if present villagers generally limit their fishing to a quota 
can this dire result be avoided. Here, individuals obtain no personal 
benefit from others limiting their fishing. Nevertheless, pursuant to 
my version of rule consequentialism, a present member of the village 
would be under a duty to limit her fishing even if her personal failure 
to abide by the quota had no effect because others were generally 
abiding by their quota. This is so because the rule “do not exceed the 
fishing quota” is a rule that (a) all should recognize ought to generally 
be complied with by virtue of the adverse consequences to future gen-
erations that would ensue if it were widely disregarded, and (b) applies 
to all with equal force since no one person could claim that she, in con-
trast to others, should be exempt. Likewise, even if a villager’s failing 
to abide by the quota would have no actual effect on future generations 
because others were not adhering to their quota, she would still be 
obliged to follow the rule for the same reasons.210 
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Brennon argues that this duty is a freestanding idea implied by sophisticated rule conse-
quentialism, Kant’s moral theory, and eudaimonistic virtue theory. Id. at 73-74. Brennon 
applies his theory to voting and argues that it is unethical to vote in ways that do not meet 
certain standards because, in aggregate, such substandard voting produces policies harm-
 




(b)   Rule Consequentialism and Child Pornography 
 The application of rule consequentialism to child pornography is 
straightforward. Because the general practice of trading or purchas-
ing child porn images over the Internet would undermine the social 
norms against child sexual contact, leading to increased incidences of 
sexual child abuse, under rule consequentialism, it would be wrong to 
engage in typical acts of child pornography possession, regardless of 
the actual consequences of those acts at the margin. Likewise, be-
cause the general proliferation of an image of sexual abuse leads to 
feelings of humiliation, helplessness, and fear of recognition on the 
part of the image’s subject, the practice of trading child porn over the 
Internet may be considered, from a rule consequentialist perspective, 
wrongful and deserving of punishment. 
 If this is correct, the possession of child pornography seems, at 
bottom, unlike other possessory offenses. As discussed in Part IV, the 
possession of narcotics is criminalized primarily because possessing 
narcotics is highly correlated with using narcotics, which leads to ad-
diction and to crime. The possession of firearms is criminalized be-
cause we do not want the wrong people to get them and commit 
crimes using them. Drug possession and gun possession seem best 
understood as primarily concerned with the harms that individual 
instances of violations may produce. As discussed below, child por-
nography possession seems more akin to offenses like tax evasion, 
insider trading, prostitution, environmental crimes, and looting. 
(c)   Rule Consequentialism and Other Crimes 
 I have argued that the wrongfulness of child pornography posses-
sion may be profitably understood from the perspective of rule conse-
quentialism. In this regard, child pornography possession is not 
unique. Rather, a disparate set of criminal offenses share the struc-
tural features of child pornography that invite rule consequentialism 
condemnation: acts that are innocent in themselves but are harmful 
in the aggregate. That rule consequentialism is useful in explaining a 
wide range of superficially dissimilar offenses supports the claim that 
it is an underlying operative principle of criminal culpability. 
 Consider tax evasion. Like child sexual abuse, tax evasion is a se-
rious offense, with penalties per instance ranging up to five years’ 
imprisonment.211 The explanation of the moral wrongdoing of tax 
evasion, however, is a matter of dispute. As Stuart Green explains, 
                                                                                                                  
ful to the community. Id. at 74-77. As will be clear in the following Section, substandard 
voting and possession of child pornography are analogous in the manner in which they 
violate moral norms. 
 211. See 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2012). 
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tax evasion is not accurately described as a matter of stealing.212 A 
paradigm case of stealing might be taking goods from a store without 
paying for them. The normal tie between payment and enjoyment is 
broken. In contrast, Green argues, when it comes to taxes, there is 
only an exceedingly attenuated connection between the governmental 
benefits enjoyed and the taxes owed.213 Taxes paid in one part of the 
country might go to fund projects in another; those owing the highest 
amount of taxes may receive the least return; taxes may be used in 
ways directly contrary to the wishes of the taxpayer.214 Tax evasion is 
not a matter of getting something without the normal payment for it. 
 Instead, Green proposes that tax evasion is best understood as a 
form of cheating, where cheating is conduct engaged in “with the in-
tent to obtain an advantage over some party with whom the rule-
breaker is in a cooperative, rule-governed relationship.”215 A para-
digm case of cheating might be using a marked deck in a poker game. 
But tax evasion rarely entails obtaining an advantage over some oth-
er party. Unlike cheating in poker, the advantage of the tax cheat 
disadvantages no one. One person’s failure to pay taxes owed will not 
result in the tax rates for others being increased, at least not in a 
system the size of the federal or any state government. Indeed, even 
if advantage over some other party is simply understood as ad-
vantage that the other party does not enjoy, the gaining of an ad-
vantage does not seem to be the moral wrong underlying tax evasion. 
Imagine that Tex and Max each develop schemes to underpay their 
taxes by $10,000, but that Tex’s scheme involves an accounting ruse 
that requires $9,000 to implement, while Max’s scheme requires no 
expenditure. Despite the fact that Max’s advantage is less than 
Ted’s, their acts seem equally worthy of punishment and indeed 
would be sanctioned equally under our current legal regime.216 
 The moral culpability of the tax evaders is not grounded in the 
governmental benefits they enjoy without payment, nor the financial 
advantage they enjoy as a result. Rather, I suggest, moral culpability 
rests on the harms associated with tax evasion. Tax evasion is a sig-
nificant social problem.217 However, tax evasion is only harmful on 
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the aggregate level. Individual acts of the typical federal tax fraud 
defendant have no significant harmful effect on anyone. In the case of 
the typical federal tax evader, the taxes unlawfully withheld are so 
small that no governmental actor (other than an occasional prosecut-
ing attorney) or policymaker is affected.218 The reduction in federal 
revenues is cloaked by clerical rounding. Thus, allocations to social 
programs are not affected nor are tax rates increased as a result of 
individual acts of evasion. Even if the act becomes public knowledge, 
the possibility of its leading others to pay less than they owe is insig-
nificant because that likelihood is not large and the total withhold-
ings of the actor and those he influences are still de minimis from the 
perspective of any policymaker. The snowball effect of a single act of 
tax avoidance is a tax protester’s delusion. Yet, if people generally 
failed to pay taxes, the pillars of government would be shaken, to the 
great disadvantage of all citizens. Accordingly, failure to pay taxes is 
a violation of the requirements of rule consequentialism and punish-
ment of tax evaders can be justified on that basis. 
 Likewise, individual acts of insider trading typically neither 
cause nor risk harm. The profit enjoyed by the inside trader is not a 
loss suffered by any one individual, but lost profits spread among 
the broad pool of stock traders who otherwise would have possessed 
the undervalued shares purchased by the inside trader. The loss to 
each was de minimis. Cumulatively, however, wide-spread insider 
trading would undermine investor confidence in the fairness of the 
stock market necessary for market long-term stability.219 According-
ly, it is properly criminalized. 
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 The criminalization of prostitution has long been a controversial 
matter. Justifications have been advanced that focus on harms asso-
ciated with specific instances of prostitution. The Model Penal Code’s 
prohibition of prostitution,220 for example, rests on a concern that ve-
nereal diseases might be spread through such sexual activity in a 
given encounter.221 The risks of crimes against the prostitution pa-
tron, or against the prostitute, have been cited as a reason for ban-
ning prostitution.222 Finally, the argument has been made that pros-
titution is an inherently immoral act that degrades the person selling 
his or her body.223 Such arguments have been closely scrutinized and 
convincingly debunked. Empirically there is little support for the 
claims that prostitution creates a high risk of venereal disease 
transmission or crime compared to regimes of either decriminalized 
or regulated commercial sex.224 The normative condemnation of pros-
titution undervalues sexual autonomy and rests on an antiquated 
view of sex as inherently tied to procreation.225 More persuasive, 
however, is the argument that if prostitution were widely engaged in, 
the cumulative effect would be the commodification, commercializa-
tion, and ultimately the devaluation of sex. Margaret Jane Radin 
asks us to: 
Suppose newspapers, radio, TV, and billboards advertised sexual 
services as imaginatively and vividly as they advertise computer 
services, health clubs, or soft drinks. Suppose the sexual partner of 
your choice could be ordered through a catalog, or through a large 
brokerage firm that has an “800” number, or at a trade show, or in a 
local showroom. Suppose the business of recruiting suppliers of sex-
ual services was carried on in the same way as corporate headhunt-
ing or training of word-processing operators. A change would occur 
in everyone’s discourse about sex, and in particular about women’s 
sexuality. New terms would emerge for particular gradations of 
market value, and new discussions would be heard of particular 
abilities or qualities in terms of their market value. With this 
change in discourse would come a change in everyone’s experience. 
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The open market might render subconscious valuation of women 
(and perhaps everyone) in sexual dollar value impossible to avoid. It 
might make the ideal of nonmonetized sharing impossible.226 
This significant social harm is thus one that only arises as the aggre-
gate of many acts of prostitution. Individual instances of prostitution 
are therefore candidates for criminalization and punishment within 
the rule consequentialist framework. 
 Environmental crimes are also ones that manifest the harms un-
derlying them on the aggregate level. Criminal penalties including 
imprisonment, for example, are available against individuals who 
knowingly violate requirements of the Clean Air Act, such as air 
quality emission standards established by state implementation 
plans, or requirements of the Clean Water Act, such as discharge lim-
its established by permit.227 While sometimes cases are brought in-
volving significant harm or risk of harm to the environment or public 
health,228 prosecutions are commonly brought in cases involving de-
ceptive conduct, facilities that operate outside the regulatory system, 
and repetitive violations, even in the absence of actual environmen-
tal harms.229 That actual harm is not a sine qua non of environmen-
tal prosecutions should not be surprising. Standards for emissions 
and discharges are established for the regulated community as a 
whole to protect public goods such as the atmosphere and large bod-
ies of water. Individual violations may have a de minimis effect on 
overall environmental quality, while widespread disregard of regu-
latory standards would have a significant environmental impact. 
Environmental crimes, like child pornography possession, are 
crimes of aggregation for only on the aggregate level does cogniza-
ble social harm typically emerge. 
 Finally, looting shares many of child pornography possession’s 
relevant features. Looting is a crime, distinct from theft or burglary, 
in seven states.230 According to Stuart Green, liability for looting typ-
ically requires that an actor “(1) make an unauthorized entry into a 
home or business; (2) in which normal security of property is not pre-
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 227. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2006) (criminalizing the discharge of a 
pollutant in violation of the Clean Water Act); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(4)-(5)(A) 
(2006). 
 228. See David M. Uhlmann, Environmental Crime Comes of Age: The Evolution of 
Criminal Enforcement in the Environmental Regulatory Scheme, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 1223, 
1246-48 (2009) (recommending that “the government should prosecute only when there is 
evidence that the violations charged caused the harm”). 
 229. Id. at 1248-52. 
 230. See Stuart P. Green, Looting, Law, and Lawlessness, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1129, 1140 
n.34 (2007). 
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sent by virtue of some natural disaster or civil disturbance . . .; and 
(3) thereby obtain control over, damage, or remove the property of 
another.”231 Penalties for looting are often greater than those for theft 
or burglary.232 Because looting occurs in the shadows of a natural or 
civic disturbance, and such disturbances typically affect a broad sec-
tion of the population, the opportunities for looting arise for many 
simultaneously. Indeed, most incidents of looting are committed by 
groups.233 Looting has been described as a “dangerous form of group 
criminal conduct.”234 Group conduct does not necessarily entail coor-
dinated conduct. Looters, however, will generally act with knowledge 
that they are not acting alone. This is so because the background 
condition for looting—natural disaster and social disturbance—are 
public phenomena and allow looters, knowing that law enforcement 
is stretched thin, to act publically and with impunity. It has been 
theorized that looting is a form of “contagion” which takes place when 
a sufficient number of persons converge or get caught up in the ex-
citement.235 In addition, resources to be looted, seized for survival, or 
purloined for profit are finite. Under these circumstances, individual 
looters can plausibly claim that “If I did not take it, somebody else 
would have,” or, at the very least, “Given the amount being taken by 
other looters, what I took did not significantly add to the losses suf-
fered by the establishment looted.” It requires little imagination to 
believe that one more items taken from a commercial establishment 
will merely overdetermine, rather than cause, its bankruptcy or be a 
trivial aspect of the insurance claim that will be made anyway. Fur-
thermore, even if individual looters realize that looting is “conta-
gious,” they will know that their act of looting cannot significantly add 
to the level of social disruption that exists independently of them. The 
contagion will occur whether they participate or not. Such reasoning as 
above of course should not be condoned. But neither should it be con-
demned on the ground that it is erroneous as a factual matter. Rather, 
it is objectionable on grounds similar to the grounds cited in connection 
with possession of child pornography: The wrongfulness of individual 
acts is not exclusively a function of their individual consequences. Acts 
may be condemned as instances of the aggregates that are the causal 
vehicles of actual social harm. 
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VI.   CONCLUSION 
 So understood, where then does this leave child pornography pos-
session in terms of the proportionality principle? The most plausible 
argument for the consistency of child pornography possession penal-
ties and the proportionality principle, I have argued, is that the pen-
alties appropriately reflect the culpable wrongdoing of the typical de-
fendant when the effects of his acts are considered in the aggregate 
under an appropriately generalized description. Unrestrained pur-
chasing and trading of child pornography by those with such predi-
lections would lead to substantial undermining of the social norms 
against child sexual abuse and stimulate the production of child por-
nography to meet increased demand, leading to higher rates of child 
sexual assaults. Likewise, greater violations of victims’ privacy would 
ensue. In contrast, unrestrained child sexual abuse by pedophiles, 
considered in aggregate, might actually produce a backlash and 
stronger measures to prevent child sexual abuse. The wrongfulness 
of contact offenses lies in their actual effects, not their aggregate 
ones. When it comes to proportionality, the penalties for child por-
nography possession thus should not be compared to the penalties for 
crimes such as child sex abuse or statutory rape. Such crimes lie on a 
different moral scale. Rather, the penalties for child pornography 
possession should be compared to the penalties for other crimes of 
aggregation, like tax evasion, insider trading, desertion, looting, etc. 
The proportionality principle is to be applied not at the level of indi-
vidually caused harm, but at the level of the aggregate harm associat-
ed with the actual or hypothetical class of acts the law seeks to deter. 
Admittedly, this move waters down the proportionality principle. It 
does not, however, reduce it to utilitarianism, for there is no guarantee 
that proportional punishment, so defined, will be sufficient to produce 
a socially optimal level of crime. Whether this weakened version of the 
proportionality principle is an intuitively attractive moral principle is 
a question open for discussion. 
